@inproceedings{feldman2016correlated,
author = {Feldman, Michal and Lucier, Brendan and Nisan, Noam},
title = {Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions},
booktitle = {The 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2016)},
year = {2016},
month = {December},
abstract = {We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid -- i.e., bid above their values.

Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue.  We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.},
url = {http://approjects.co.za/?big=en-us/research/publication/correlated-coarse-equilibria-single-item-auctions/},
edition = {The 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2016)},
}