@inproceedings{hartline2005from,
author = {Hartline, Jason D. and McGrew, Robert},
title = {From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions},
booktitle = {Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005)},
year = {2005},
month = {June},
abstract = {We investigate the class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items to bidders who each desire one unit. We adopt the worst-case competitive framework defined by [9, 5] that compares the profit of an auction to that of an optimal single-price sale of least two items. In this paper, we first derive an optimal auction for three items, answering an open question from [8]. Second, we show that the form of this auction is independent of the competitive framework used. Third, we propose a schema for converting a given limited-supply auction into an unlimited supply auction. Applying this technique to our optimal auction for three items, we achieve an auction with a competitive ratio of 3.25, which improves upon the previously best-known competitive ratio of 3.39 from [7]. Finally, we generalize a result from [8] and extend our understanding of the nature of the optimal competitive auction by showing that the optimal competitive auction occasionally offers prices that are higher than all bid values.},
publisher = {ACM Press, New York},
url = {http://approjects.co.za/?big=en-us/research/publication/from-optimal-limited-to-unlimited-supply-auctions/},
pages = {175-182},
edition = {Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005)},
}