@inproceedings{borgs2005multi-unit,
author = {Borgs, Christian and Chayes, Jennifer and Immorlica, Nicole and Mahdian, Mohammad and Saberi, Amin},
title = {Multi-unit Auctions with Budget-constrained Bidders},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC)},
year = {2005},
month = {January},
abstract = {We study a multi-unit auction with multiple agents, each of whom has a private valuation and budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense that, under standard assumptions, we prove that it is impossible to design a non-trivial truthful auction which allocates all items, while we provide the design of an asymptotically revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism which may allocate only some of the items. Our asymptotic parameter is a budget dominance parameter which measures the size of the budget of a single agent relative to the maximum revenue. We discuss the relevance of these results for the design of online ad auctions.},
url = {http://approjects.co.za/?big=en-us/research/publication/multi-unit-auctions-budget-constrained-bidders/},
pages = {44-51},
edition = {Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC)},
}