@inproceedings{bhattacharya2013near-optimal,
author = {Bhattacharya, Sayan and Koutsoupias, Elias and Kulkarni, Janardhan (Jana) and Leonardi, Stefano and Roughgarden, Tim and Xu, Xiaoming},
title = {Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders},
booktitle = {EC '13 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce},
year = {2013},
month = {June},
abstract = {We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments.},
url = {http://approjects.co.za/?big=en-us/research/publication/near-optimal-multi-unit-auctions-ordered-bidders/},
edition = {EC '13 Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce},
}