@inproceedings{lucier2010price,
author = {Lucier, Brendan and Borodin, Allan},
title = {Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions},
booktitle = {Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) 2010},
year = {2010},
month = {January},
abstract = {We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes-Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium, the resulting price of anarchy bound is close to the approximation factor of the underlying greedy algorithm.},
url = {http://approjects.co.za/?big=en-us/research/publication/price-anarchy-greedy-auctions/},
edition = {Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) 2010},
}