@article{dupuy2020taxation,
author = {Dupuy, Arnaud and Galichon, Alfred and Jaffe, Sonia and Kominers, Scott Duke},
title = {Taxation in Matching Markets},
year = {2020},
month = {July},
abstract = {We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.},
url = {http://approjects.co.za/?big=en-us/research/publication/taxation-in-matching-markets/},
pages = {1591-1634},
journal = {International Economic Review},
volume = {61},
number = {4},
}