

U-Prove Bit Decomposition Extension

Draft Revision 1

Microsoft Research

Author: Mira Belenkiy

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Summary

This document extends the U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [\[UPCS\]](#) by specifying bit decomposition proofs, useful for other extension protocols.

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Change history

Version	Description
Revision 1	Initial draft

1 Introduction

This document extends the U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [\[UPCS\]](#) by specifying bit decomposition proofs, useful for other extension protocols.

The Prover and Verifier have as common input a list of values $C, C_0, C_1, \dots, C_{n-1} \in G_q$ and a pair of generators $g, h \in G_q$. The Prover wants to show that the C_i are Pedersen Commitments to the bit decomposition of the committed value in C .

$$\pi = PK \left\{ \{\alpha_i, \beta_i\}_{i \in [0, n-1]}, \gamma \mid (\forall i: C_i = g^{\alpha_i} h^{\beta_i} \wedge \alpha_i \in [0, 1]) \wedge C = h^\gamma \prod_{i \in [0, n-1]} (C_i)^{2^i} \right\}$$

The Prover knows a set of values $\{x_i, y_i\}_{i \in [0, n-1]}$, z that would satisfy the above relation. The Prover will create a special honest-verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge using its witness $\{x_i, y_i\}_{i \in [0, n-1]}$, z that satisfies the above relation. The Prover will create n separate set-membership proofs [\[EXSM\]](#) to show that $\forall i: C_i = g^{\alpha_i} h^{\beta_i} \wedge \alpha_i \in [0, 1]$. The Prover will create a separate equality proof [\[EXEQ\]](#) to show that $C = h^\gamma \prod_{i \in [0, n-1]} (C_i)^{2^i}$.

The U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [\[UPCS\]](#) allows the Prover, during the token presentation protocol, to create a Pedersen Commitment and show that the committed value is equal to a particular token attribute. The Prover MAY use this Pedersen Commitment as either C or any of the C_i for the bit decomposition proof. The Issuance and Token Presentation protocols are unaffected by this extension. The Prover may choose to create a bit decomposition proof after these two protocols complete.

The committed value in C and all of the C_i MUST NOT be hashed. If any of these values are U-Prove token attributes, the attributes also MUST NOT be hashed.

1.1 Notation

In addition to the notation defined in [\[UPCS\]](#), the following notation is used throughout the document.

C	Value of the Prover's Pedersen Commitment.
x	Committed value of Pedersen Commitment C .
y	Opening of Pedersen Commitment C .
C_i	Commitment to the i^{th} bit of the decomposition of x .
x_i	The i^{th} bit of the decomposition of x , the committed value of Pedersen Commitment C_i .
y_i	The opening of Pedersen Commitment C_i .
A	Input to equality proof; C divided by the composition of the C_i .
z	Prover's witness for equality proof, the discrete logarithm of A .
M	Part of set membership proof: "response".
π	Equality proof.
π_i	Set membership proof.

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “SHOULD”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#).

1.2 Feature overview

The Bit Decomposition proof consists of a straightforward combination of a set membership proof and an equality proof.

To show that each value C_i is a Pedersen Commitment to either 0 or 1, the Prover will create a set membership proof [EXSM](#) for the set $[0,1]$.

To show that composing the committed values in the C_i results in C , the Prover will create an equality proof [EXEQ](#). The Prover knows witnesses $x, y, (x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1) \dots, (x_{n-1}, y_{n-1})$ that are the openings of $C, C_0, C_1, \dots, C_{n-1}$. The Prover will compute

$$z := y - \sum_{i \in [0, n-1]} 2^i y_i \text{ mod } q$$

It is easy to see that the following relation holds:

$$C = h^z \cdot \prod_{i \in [0, n-1]} (C_i)^{2^i}$$

The Prover will create proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of $A = C / \prod (C_i)^{2^i}$ in terms of the generator h .

2 Protocol specification

As the bit decomposition proof can be performed independently of the U-Prove token presentation protocols, the common parameters consist simply of the group G_q , two generators g and h , and a cryptographic function \mathcal{H} . The commitments $C, C_0, C_1, \dots, C_{n-1}$ and their openings MAY be generated by the Prover.

2.1 Presentation

The presentation protocol consists of creating n set membership proofs for the set $[0,1]$, and an equality proof to prove valid decomposition.




Figure 1: BitDecompositionProve

2.2 Verification

The Verifier verifies the set membership and equality proofs.




Figure 2: BitDecompositionVerify

3 Security considerations

The bit decomposition proof protocol is a composition of the set membership proof and the equality proof. The following restrictions apply:

1. The Prover and the Verifier MUST NOT know the relative discrete logarithm $\log_g h$ of the generators g and h . This is not an issue if the generators are chosen from the list of U-Prove recommended parameters.

References

- [EXEQ] Mira Belenkiy. *U-Prove Equality Proof Extension*. Microsoft, June 2014. <http://www.microsoft.com/u-prove>.
- [EXSM] Mira Belenkiy. *U-Prove Set Membership Proof Extension*. Microsoft, June 2014. <http://www.microsoft.com/u-prove>.
- [RFC2119] Scott Bradner. *RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels*, 1997. <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2119.txt>.
- [UPCS] Christian Paquin, Greg Zaverucha. *U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1 (Revision 3)*. Microsoft, December 2013. <http://www.microsoft.com/u-prove>.