U-Prove Designated-Verifier Accumulator Revocation Extension

Draft Revision 1

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Summary

This document extends the U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [UPCS] by specifying an efficient revocation mechanism based on a dynamic accumulator. This scheme requires a designated verifier that shares the Revocation Authority's private key. Unlike many accumulator schemes based on bilinear pairings, this scheme is built using a prime-order group (like the ones defined in [UPCS]) and is therefore suitable for system that require standard constructions.

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Change history

Version	Date	Description
Draft Revision 1	09/11/2013	Initial draft
	02/26/2014	Added clarification to Figure 3

1 Introduction

This document extends the U-Prove Cryptographic Specification [UPCS] by specifying an efficient revocation mechanism based on a dynamic accumulator. This scheme requires a designated verifier that shares the Revocation Authority's private key. Unlike many accumulator schemes based on bilinear pairings, this scheme is built using a prime-order group (like the ones defined in [UPCS]) and is therefore suitable for system that require standard constructions.

1.1 Notation

In addition to the notation defined in [UPCS], the following notation is used throughout the document.

 $a \notin A$ Indicates that element *a* is not in set *A*.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].

1.2 Feature overview

Revocation is an important feature of a credential system; this document specifies a scheme based on a dynamic accumulator using a standard prime order group instead of bilinear pairings.¹

A cryptographic accumulator allows the aggregation of a large set of elements into one constant-size value, and the ability to prove that an element has been aggregated or not in the accumulator.

The accumulator scheme is built on the prime order groups defined in [UPCS]; it is therefore possible to use the scheme as a revocation mechanism for U-Prove tokens. The *Revocation Authority* is a new party that manages the revocation list and validates the users' non-revocation proofs. Each token encodes a unique user identifier UID; a non-revocation proof consists of proving that the value UID has not been accumulated in the accumulator. In order to create an efficient non-revocation proof, users periodically obtain revocation witnesses (computed on-demand by the Revocation Authority, or by users as the revocation list is updated); users can then compute in constant time the non-revocation proof.

We detail the DA revocation extension in five steps.

- 1 **Revocation Authority setup**: The Revocation Authority generates its public parameters and secret key, and makes the public parameters available to users.
- 2 **Token issuance**: The user obtains U-Prove tokens encoding her unique identifier UID from the Issuer.
- 3 **Revocation list management**: Periodically, the Revocation Authority updates the revocation accumulator, and the user obtains non-revocation witnesses from the Revocation Authority, or computes them using the revocation list update.
- 4 **Token presentation**: The user presents a U-Prove token to the Verifier, including a non-revocation proof (using the non-revocation witnesses). The Verifier validates the presentation proof.
- 5 **Revocation verification**: The Verifier sends the non-revocation proof to the Revocation Authority that verifies that the undisclosed UID does not appear on the current revocation list.

¹ Many accumulator-based schemes rely on bilinear pairings, common in the cryptographic literature, but not yet popular in industry systems and standards.

2 **Protocol specification**

2.1 Revocation Authority setup

The Revocation Authority generates its key and parameters as specified in Figure 1. The group G_q MUST match the one specified in the parameters of Issuers that will issue tokens revocable by this Revocation Authority.

<u>RASetup(</u>)	
Input Parameters: desc(G_q), g (the G_q generator)	
Computation Choose δ, r_1 and r_2 at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* Compute $P \coloneqq g, H \coloneqq g^{r_1}, K \coloneqq H^{\delta}, G \coloneqq g^{r_2}$	
Output Private key: δ Public key: P, H, K, G	

Figure 1: Function RASetup

2.2 Token issuance

Token issuance follows the same steps as in [UPCS]. One of the attributes, called the *revocation attribute* and denoted x_{id} (where *id* is an index value between 1 and the number of attributes in the tokens), is reserved for revocation.

2.3 Revocation list management

The Revocation Authority computes the accumulator corresponding to a set of revoked attribute values² (see Figure 2); the accumulator is re-computed when values are added or removed from the revocation list. Users periodically obtain revocation witnesses corresponding to their revocation attribute x_{id} allowing them to create non-revocation proofs. If the revocation list is secret, or for better efficiency, the witnesses are computed by the Revocation Authority (see Figure 3); otherwise, the witnesses are computed by users and updated when values are added or removed from the revocation list (see Figure 4).

² Initially, this set can be empty.

Comput	ceAccumulator()
Inpu	ut
	Revocation Authority private key: $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{*}$
	Revocation Authority public key: $P, H, K, G \in G_a$
	List of revoked attribute values: $R = \{x_1,, x_m\} \in \mathbb{Z}_q - \{\delta\}$
Con	Putation $V := P^{\prod_{x \in R}(\delta + x)}$
Out	put

Return accumulator V



Input	
F	Revocation Authority private key: $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_{a}^{*}$
F	Revocation Authority public key: $P, H, K, G \in G_a$
L	ist of revoked attribute values: $R = \{x_1, \dots, x_m\} \in \mathbb{Z}_q - \{\delta\}$
٦	Farget attribute value: $x_{id} \notin R$
(Current accumulator: $V \in G_q$
Com	outation
($d = f(\delta) \mod (\delta + x_{id}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ where $f(\delta) = \prod_{x \in R} (\delta + x)$
l	$W = P^{(\prod_{x \in R} (\delta + x) - d)/(\delta + x_{id})}$
($Q = VW^{-x_{id}}P^{-d}$
Outo	ut .
cuth	$\mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{x}}$

Figure 3: Function ComputeWitness

Note that the computation of *d* is a polynomial division of polynomial $f(\delta) = \prod_{x \in R} (\delta + x)$ over polynomial $(\delta + x_{id})$ in polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[\delta]$. As the denominator is a polynomial of degree 1, the result *d* is a polynomial of degree 0, i.e. a constant, in the polynomial ring. So *d* can be computed from just the set *R* and does not depend on δ .

UpdateWitness()			
Input			
Revocation Authority private key: $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_{a}^{*}$			
Revocation Authority public key: $P, H, K, G \in G_a$			
Revocation attribute value: x_{id}			
New revoked value: x'			
Boolean: add (if true, x' will be added to the witness, otherwise it will be removed)			
Old accumulator: $V \in G_q$			
Old witness: $(d, W, Q)_{x_{id}}$			
Updated accumulator: $V' \in G_q$			
Computation			
if add = true			
$d' \coloneqq d(x' - x_{id})$			
$W' \coloneqq VW^{(x'-x_{id})}$			
$O' := V'W'^{-x_{id}}P^{-d'}$			
else			
$d' \coloneqq d(x' - x_{id})^{-1}$			
$W' - (V'^{-1}W)(x'^{-x_{id}})^{-1}$			
$O' \leftarrow V' M'^{-x_{id}} D^{-d'}$			
Q := V VV = I			
Output			
Updated revocation witness: $(d', W', Q')_{x_{id}}$			
tu tu			

Figure 4: Function UpdateWitness

2.4 Token presentation

The presentation proof is generated according to the needs of the application following [UPCS], but additionally x_{id} is a committed attribute. The (public) output $\tilde{c}_{id} = g^{x_{id}}g_1^{o_{id}}$ and the (private) opening information (x_{id} , o_{id}), are input to the non-revocation proof generation defined in Figure 5.

GenerateNonRevocationProof() Input Parameters: UID_P, desc(G_a), UID_H, g_1 Commitment to x_{id} : \tilde{c}_{id} Opening information: x_{id} , o_{id} Revocation Authority public key: P, H, K, G Revocation witness: $(d, W, Q)_{x_{id}}$ Computation Generate $t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3, k_0, \dots, k_8$ at random from \mathbb{Z}_q $B \coloneqq q^{k_0} q_1^{t_0}$ $X \coloneqq WH^{t_1}$ $Y \coloneqq QK^{t_1}$ $R \coloneqq G^{t_1} H^{t_2}$ $S \coloneqq G^{d^{-1}}H^{t_3}$ $T_1 \coloneqq G^{k_1} H^{k_2}$ $T_2 \coloneqq G^{k_7} H^{k_4} R^{-k_0}$ $\overline{T_3} \coloneqq G^{k_6} H^{k_3}$ $T_4 \coloneqq H^{k_8} S^{-k_5}$ $\Gamma := X^{-k_0} H^{k_7} K^{k_1} P^{-k_5}$ $c' \coloneqq \mathcal{H}(g,g_1,P,H,K,G,\tilde{c}_{id},B,X,Y,R,S,T_1,T_2,T_3,T_4,\Gamma)$ $r' \coloneqq -c'^{\tilde{o}_{id}} + t_0 \bmod q$ $s_0 \coloneqq -c'x_{id} + k_0 \mod q$ for each $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}, s_i \coloneqq -c't_i + k_i \mod q$ $s_4 \coloneqq -c't_2x_{id} + k_4 \mod q$ $s_5 \coloneqq -c'd + k_5 \mod q$ $s_6 \coloneqq -c'd^{-1} + k_6 \mod q$ $s_7 \coloneqq -c't_1x_{id} + k_7 \mod q$ $s_8 \coloneqq -c't_3d + k_8 \mod q$ Delete $t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3, k_0, \dots, k_8$ Output Return c', r', s₀, ..., s₈, X, Y, R, S

Figure 5: Function GenerateNonRevocationProof.

2.5 Revocation verification

The revocation verification function, defined in Figure 6, is run after the corresponding presentation proof has been successfully verified. Inputs are the commitment \tilde{c}_{id} from the presentation proof and the non-revocation proof. If the presentation and non-revocation proofs are valid, then the verifier has assurance that \tilde{c}_{id} is a valid commitment to the attribute x_{id} and that x_{id} is not in the revocation list.

 $\begin{array}{l} \hline \textbf{VerifyNonRevocationProof}() \\ \hline \textbf{Input} \\ & \text{Parameters: desc}(G_q), g_1 \\ & \text{Commitment to } x_{id}: \tilde{c}_{id} \\ & \text{Non-revocation proof: } c', r', s_0, \dots, s_8, X, Y, R, S \\ & \text{Revocation Authority public key: } P, H, K, G \\ & \text{Revocation Authority private key: } \delta \\ \hline \textbf{Computation} \\ & B \coloneqq g^{s_0} g_1^{r'} \tilde{c}_{id}^{c'} \\ & T_1 \coloneqq G^{s_1} H^{s_2} R^{c'} \\ & T_2 \coloneqq G^{s_7} H^{s_4} R^{-s_0} \\ & T_3 \coloneqq G^{s_6} H^{s_3} S^{c'} \\ & T_4 \coloneqq G^{-c'} H^{s_8} S^{-s_5} \\ & \Gamma \coloneqq X^{-s_0} H^{s_7} K^{s_1} P^{-s_5} (V^{-1}Y)^{c'} \\ & \text{Verify that } c' = \mathcal{H}(g, g_1, P, H, K, G, \tilde{c}_{id}, B, X, Y, R, S, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, \Gamma) \\ & \text{Verify that } Y = X^{\delta} \end{array}$

Figure 6: Function VerifyNonRevocationProof

References

- [RFC2119] Scott Bradner. *RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels*, 1997. <u>ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2119.txt</u>.
- [UPCS] Christian Paquin, Greg Zaverucha. *U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1 (Revision 2)*. Microsoft, April 2013. <u>http://www.microsoft.com/u-prove</u>.