{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Microsoft Research","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research","author_name":"Brendan Lucier","author_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/people\/brlucier\/","title":"On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions - Microsoft Research","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"xD6fX8aSl0\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/limitations-greedy-mechanism-design-truthful-combinatorial-auctions\/\">On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/limitations-greedy-mechanism-design-truthful-combinatorial-auctions\/embed\/#?secret=xD6fX8aSl0\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions&#8221; &#8212; Microsoft Research\" data-secret=\"xD6fX8aSl0\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script type=\"text\/javascript\">\n\/* <![CDATA[ *\/\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/* ]]> *\/\n<\/script>\n","description":"We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special case in which agents are interested in sets of size at most s (s-CAs), where a simple greedy algorithm obtains an s+1 approximation but no [&hellip;]"}