{"id":168200,"date":"2016-06-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2016-06-30T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/msr-research-item\/block-wise-non-malleable-codes\/"},"modified":"2018-10-16T20:09:56","modified_gmt":"2018-10-17T03:09:56","slug":"block-wise-non-malleable-codes","status":"publish","type":"msr-research-item","link":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/publication\/block-wise-non-malleable-codes\/","title":{"rendered":"Block-wise Non-Malleable Codes"},"content":{"rendered":"

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS ’10) provide the guarantee that if a codeword c of a message m, is modified by a tampering function f to c’, then c’ either decodes to m or to “something unrelated” to m. It is known that non-malleable codes cannot exist for the class of all tampering functions and hence a lot of work has focused on explicitly constructing such codes against a large and natural class of tampering functions. One such popular, but restricted, class is the so-called split-state model in which the tampering function operates on different parts of the codeword independently. In this work, we consider a stronger adversarial model called block-wise tampering model, in which we allow tampering to depend on more than one block: if a codeword consists of two blocks c = (c1; c2), then the first tampering function f1 could produce a tampered part c’1 = f1(c1) and the second tampering function f2 could produce c’2 = f2(c1; c2) depending on both c2 and c1. The notion similarly extends to multiple blocks where tampering of block ci could happen with the knowledge of all cj for j<=i. We argue this is a natural notion where, for example, the blocks are sent one by one and the adversary must send the tampered block before it gets the next block. A little thought reveals however that one cannot construct such codes that are non-malleable (in the standard sense) against such a powerful adversary: indeed, upon receiving the last block, an adversary could decode the entire codeword and then can tamper depending on the message.<\/p>\n

In light of this impossibility, we consider a natural relaxation called non-malleable codes with replacement which requires the adversary to produce not only related but also a valid codeword in order to succeed. Unfortunately, we show that even this relaxed definition is not achievable in the information-theoretic setting (i.e., when the tampering functions can be unbounded) which implies that we must turn our attention towards computationally bounded adversaries.<\/p>\n

As our main result, we show how to construct block-wise non-malleable codes from sub-exponentially hard one-way permutations. Moreover, we provide an interesting connection between block-wise non-malleable codes and non-malleable commitments. We show that any block-wise nonmalleable code can be converted into a non-malleable (w.r.t. opening) commitment scheme. Our techniques, quite surprisingly, give rise to a non-malleable commitment scheme (secure against so-called synchronizing adversaries), in which only the committer sends messages. We believe this result to be of independent interest. In the other direction, we show that any non-interactive non-malleable (w.r.t. opening) commitment can be used to construct a block-wise non-malleable code only with 2 blocks. Unfortunately, such commitment scheme exists only under highly non-standard assumptions (adaptive one-way functions) and hence can not substitute our main construction.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS ’10) provide the guarantee that if a codeword c of a message m, is modified by a tampering function f to c’, then c’ either decodes to m or to “something unrelated” to m. It is known that non-malleable codes cannot exist for the class of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"msr-url-field":"","msr-podcast-episode":"","msrModifiedDate":"","msrModifiedDateEnabled":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"msr-content-type":[3],"msr-research-highlight":[],"research-area":[13561,13558],"msr-publication-type":[193716],"msr-product-type":[],"msr-focus-area":[],"msr-platform":[],"msr-download-source":[],"msr-locale":[268875],"msr-field-of-study":[],"msr-conference":[],"msr-journal":[],"msr-impact-theme":[],"msr-pillar":[],"class_list":["post-168200","msr-research-item","type-msr-research-item","status-publish","hentry","msr-research-area-algorithms","msr-research-area-security-privacy-cryptography","msr-locale-en_us"],"msr_publishername":"","msr_edition":"ICALP 2016","msr_affiliation":"","msr_published_date":"2016-06-30","msr_host":"","msr_duration":"","msr_version":"","msr_speaker":"","msr_other_contributors":"","msr_booktitle":"","msr_pages_string":"","msr_chapter":"","msr_isbn":"","msr_journal":"","msr_volume":"","msr_number":"","msr_editors":"","msr_series":"","msr_issue":"","msr_organization":"","msr_how_published":"","msr_notes":"","msr_highlight_text":"","msr_release_tracker_id":"","msr_original_fields_of_study":"","msr_download_urls":"","msr_external_url":"","msr_secondary_video_url":"","msr_longbiography":"","msr_microsoftintellectualproperty":1,"msr_main_download":"246011","msr_publicationurl":"http:\/\/eprint.iacr.org\/2015\/129","msr_doi":"","msr_publication_uploader":[{"type":"file","title":"129","viewUrl":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/02\/129.pdf","id":246011,"label_id":0},{"type":"url","title":"http:\/\/eprint.iacr.org\/2015\/129","viewUrl":false,"id":false,"label_id":0}],"msr_related_uploader":"","msr_attachments":[{"id":0,"url":"http:\/\/eprint.iacr.org\/2015\/129"}],"msr-author-ordering":[{"type":"user_nicename","value":"nichandr","user_id":33084,"rest_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/microsoft-research\/v1\/researchers?person=nichandr"},{"type":"user_nicename","value":"vipul","user_id":34597,"rest_url":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/microsoft-research\/v1\/researchers?person=vipul"},{"type":"text","value":"Pratyay Mukherjee","user_id":0,"rest_url":false},{"type":"text","value":"Omkant Pandey","user_id":0,"rest_url":false},{"type":"text","value":"Jalaj Upadhyay","user_id":0,"rest_url":false}],"msr_impact_theme":[],"msr_research_lab":[199562],"msr_event":[],"msr_group":[144675,144938,381431],"msr_project":[],"publication":[],"video":[],"download":[],"msr_publication_type":"inproceedings","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-research-item\/168200"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-research-item"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/msr-research-item"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-research-item\/168200\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":409892,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-research-item\/168200\/revisions\/409892"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=168200"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"msr-content-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-content-type?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-research-highlight","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-research-highlight?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-research-area","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/research-area?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-publication-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-publication-type?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-product-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-product-type?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-focus-area","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-focus-area?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-platform","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-platform?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-download-source","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-download-source?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-locale","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-locale?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-field-of-study","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-field-of-study?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-conference","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-conference?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-journal","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-journal?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-impact-theme","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-impact-theme?post=168200"},{"taxonomy":"msr-pillar","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-pillar?post=168200"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}