{"id":185732,"date":"2010-09-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-12-28T09:39:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/msr-research-item\/price-of-anarchy-in-adword-auctions\/"},"modified":"2016-08-22T11:28:24","modified_gmt":"2016-08-22T18:28:24","slug":"price-of-anarchy-in-adword-auctions","status":"publish","type":"msr-video","link":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/video\/price-of-anarchy-in-adword-auctions\/","title":{"rendered":"Price of Anarchy in Adword Auctions"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"asset-content\">\n<p>In this talk we consider the quality of equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auction, a simple model of auctions widely used in the newly developing markets for search advertising . It is known that  in the full information model, the Generalized Second Price Auction has socially optimal Nash equilibria (i.e., that the Price of Stability is 1), but not all equilibria are optimal. Even worse, in the Bayesian setting socially optimal Nash equilibria may not exists . In this talk we will show that under some mild assumptions, the price of anarchy is of this game is small both in the full information and in the Bayesian settings.  The results are joint work with Renato Paes Leme.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p><!-- .asset-content --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In this talk we consider the quality of equilibria in Generalized Second Price Auction, a simple model of auctions widely used in the newly developing markets for search advertising . It is known that in the full information model, the Generalized Second Price Auction has socially optimal Nash equilibria (i.e., that the Price of Stability [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":280937,"template":"","meta":{"msr-url-field":"","msr-podcast-episode":"","msrModifiedDate":"","msrModifiedDateEnabled":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"research-area":[],"msr-video-type":[],"msr-locale":[268875],"msr-impact-theme":[],"msr-pillar":[],"class_list":["post-185732","msr-video","type-msr-video","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","msr-locale-en_us"],"msr_download_urls":"","msr_external_url":"https:\/\/youtu.be\/pTDStIbLKhA","msr_secondary_video_url":"","msr_video_file":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-video\/185732"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-video"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/msr-video"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-video\/185732\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/280937"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=185732"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"msr-research-area","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/research-area?post=185732"},{"taxonomy":"msr-video-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-video-type?post=185732"},{"taxonomy":"msr-locale","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-locale?post=185732"},{"taxonomy":"msr-impact-theme","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-impact-theme?post=185732"},{"taxonomy":"msr-pillar","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/research\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/msr-pillar?post=185732"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}