GitHub was the primary platform used in the delivery of the initial access payloads and is referenced throughout this blog post; however, Microsoft Threat Intelligence also observed one payload hosted on Discord and another hosted on Dropbox.

The GitHub repositories, which were taken down, stored malware used to deploy additional malicious files and scripts. Once the initial malware from GitHub gained a foothold on the device, the additional files deployed had a modular and multi-stage approach to payload delivery, execution, and persistence. The files were used to collect system information and to set up further malware and scripts to exfiltrate documents and data from the compromised host. This activity is tracked under the umbrella name Storm-0408 that we use to track numerous threat actors associated with remote access or information-stealing malware and who use phishing, search engine optimization (SEO), or malvertising campaigns to distribute malicious payloads.

In this blog, we provide our analysis of this large-scale malvertising campaign, detailing our findings regarding the redirection chain and various payloads used across the multi-stage attack chain. We further provide recommendations for mitigating the impact of this threat, detection details, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and hunting guidance to locate related activity. By sharing this research, we aim to raise awareness about the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in this widespread activity so organizations can better prepare and implement effective mitigation strategies to protect their systems and data.

We would like to thank the GitHub security team for their prompt response and collaboration in taking down the malicious repositories.

GitHub activity and redirection chain

Since at least early December 2024, multiple hosts downloaded first-stage payloads from malicious GitHub repositories. The users were redirected to GitHub through a series of other redirections. Analysis of the redirector chain determined the attack likely originated from illegal streaming websites where users can watch pirated videos. The streaming websites embedded malvertising redirectors within movie frames to generate pay-per-view or pay-per-click revenue from malvertising platforms. These redirectors subsequently routed traffic through one or two additional malicious redirectors, ultimately leading to another website, such as a malware or tech support scam website, which then redirected to GitHub.

Multiple stages of malware were deployed in this campaign, as listed below, and the several different stages of activity that occurred depended on the payload dropped during the second stage.

• The first-stage payload that was hosted on GitHub served as the dropper for the next stage of payloads.
• The second-stage files were used to conduct system discovery and to exfiltrate system information that was Base64-encoded into the URL and sent over HTTP to an IP address. The information collected included data on memory size, graphic details, screen resolution, operating system (OS), and user paths.
• Various third-stage payloads were deployed depending on the second-stage payload. In general, the third-stage payload conducted additional malicious activities such as command and control (C2) to download additional files and to exfiltrate data, as well as defense evasion techniques.

The full redirect chain was composed of four to five layers. Microsoft researchers determined malvertising redirectors were contained within an iframe on illegal streaming websites.

There were several redirections that occurred before arriving at the malicious content stored on GitHub.

Attack chain

Once the redirection to GitHub occurred, the malware hosted on GitHub established the initial foothold on the user’s device and functioned as a dropper for additional payload stages and running malicious code. The additional payloads included information stealers to collect system and browser information on the compromised device, of which most were either Lumma stealer or an updated version of Doenerium. Depending on the initial payload, the deployment of NetSupport, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, was also often deployed alongside the infostealer. Besides the information stealers, PowerShell, JavaScript, VBScript, and AutoIT scripts were run on the host. The threat actors incorporated use of living-off-the-land binaries and scripts (LOLBAS) like PowerShell.exe, MSBuild.exe, and RegAsm.exe for C2 and data exfiltration of user data and browser credentials.

After the initial foothold was gained, the activity led to a modular and multi-stage approach to payload delivery, execution, and persistence. Each stage dropped another payload with a different function, as outlined below. Actions conducted across these stages include system discovery (memory, GPU, OS, signed-in users, and others), opening browser credential files, Data Protection API (DPAPI) crypt data calls, and other functions such as obfuscated script execution and named pipe creations to conduct data exfiltration. Persistence was achieved through modification of the registry run keys and the addition of a shortcut file to the Windows Startup folder.

Several stages of malicious activity to conduct deployment of additional malware, collections, and exfiltration of data to a C2 were observed. While not every single initial payload followed these exact steps, this is an overall view of what occurred across most incidents analyzed:

First-stage payload: Establishing a foothold on the host

During the first stage, a payload is dropped onto the user’s device from the binary hosted on GitHub, establishing a foothold on that device. As of mid-January 2025, the first-stage payloads discovered were digitally signed with a newly created certificate. A total of twelve different certificates were identified, all of which have been revoked.

Most of these initial payloads dropped the following legitimate files to leverage their functionality. These files were either leveraged by the first-stage payload or by later-stage payloads, depending on the actions being conducted.

Depending on the first-stage payload that was initially established on the compromised device, Microsoft observed different second-stage payloads and several different methods for delivering these payloads to the device.

Second-stage payload: System discovery, collection, and exfiltration

The main purpose of the second-stage payload is to conduct system discovery and collect that data for exfiltration to the C2. The system information collected includes data such as memory size, graphic card details, screen resolution, operating system, user paths, and a reference to the second-stage payload’s file name.

This was accomplished by querying the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProductName for the Windows OS version and running commands, such as the echo command, to gather the device’s name (%COMPUTERNAME%) and domain name (%USERDOMAIN%).

System data collected by the second-stage payload is Base64-encoded and exfiltrated as a query parameter to an IP address.

Third-stage payload: PowerShell and .exe binary

Depending on the second-stage payload, either one or multiple executables are dropped onto the compromised device, and sometimes an accompanying encoded PowerShell script. These files initiate a chain of events that conduct command execution, payload delivery, defensive evasion, persistence, C2 communications, and data exfiltration. The analysis of the dropped executables is first discussed below, followed by review of the PowerShell scripts observed.

Third-stage .exe analysis

The second-stage payloads run the dropped third-stage executables using the command prompt (for example, cmd.exe  /d /s /c “”C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\ApproachAllan.exe””). The /c flag ensures that the command runs and exits quickly. When the third-stage .exe runs, it drops a command file (.cmd) and launches it using the command prompt (for example, “cmd.exe” /c copy Beauty Beauty.cmd && Beauty.cmd). The .cmd file performs several actions, such as running tasklist, to initiate the discovery of running programs. This is followed by the findstr to search for keywords associated with security software:

The .cmd file also concatenates multiple files into one with a single character file name: “cmd /c copy /b ..\Verzeichnis + ..\Controlling + ..\Constitute + ..\Enjoyed + ..\Confusion + ..\Min +..\Statutory J”. This single character filename is used next.

Following this, the third-stage .exe produces an AutoIT v3 interpreter file that is renamed from the typical file name of AutoIt3.exe and uses a .com file extension. The .cmd file initiates the execution of the .com file against the single character binary (such as Briefly.com J). Note, most of the second-stage payloads follow this progression chain, and as mentioned a second-stage payload can also drop multiple executables, all following the same process. For example:

First stage

• X-essentiApp.exe

Second stage

• Ionixnignx.exe

Third stage

• EverybodyViewing.exe
• ReliefOrganizational.exe
• InflationWinston.exe

Third-stage command files

• Beauty.cmd
• Possess.cmd
• Villa.cmd

Fourth-stage AutoIT .com files

• Alexandria.com
• Kills.com
• Briefly.com

We observed multiple .com files originating from different dropped executables, each performing distinct functions while occasionally overlapping in behavior. These files facilitate persistence, process injection, remote debugging, and data exfiltration through various mechanisms. One .com file, such as Alexandria.com, drops a .scr file (another renamed AutoIT interpreter), and a .js (JavaScript) file with the same name as the .scr file. The purpose of the JavaScript file is to ensure persistence by creating a .url internet shortcut that points to the JavaScript file and is placed in the Startup folder, ensuring that the .scr file executes when the .js file executes (through Wscript.exe) upon user sign-in. Alternatively, persistence can be achieved using scheduled task creation. The .scr file can initiate C2 connections, enable remote debugging on Chrome or Edge within a hidden desktop session, or create TCP listening sockets on ports 9220-9229. This functionality allows threat actors to monitor browsing activity and interact with an active browser instance. These files can also open sensitive data files, indicating their role in facilitating post-exploitation activities.

Another .com file, such as affiliated.com, also focuses on remote debugging and browser monitoring. In addition to remote monitoring, affiliated.com initiates network connections to Telegram, Let’s Encrypt, and threat actor domains, potentially for C2 or exfiltration. It also accesses DPAPI to decrypt sensitive stored credentials and retrieve browser data.

The final observed .com file, such as Briefly.com, exhibits behavior similar to affiliated.com but extends its capabilities to include screenshot capture, data exfiltration, and PowerShell-based execution. This file accesses browser and user data for collection, establishes connections to Pastebin and additional C2 domains, and drops the fourth-stage PowerShell script.

The order in which these .com files run is not strictly defined, as one or multiple files can perform overlapping functions depending on the third-stage payload. In many cases, the .com files also leverage LOLBAS like RegAsm.exe by dropping a legitimate file into the %TEMP% directory or injecting malicious code into it using NtAllocateVirtualMemory and SetThreadContext API function calls. RegAsm.exe is used to establish C2 connections over TCP ports 15647 or 9000, exfiltrating data, accessing DPAPI for decryption, monitoring keystrokes using the WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook, and more. This flexibility in execution allows threat actors to tailor their approach based on environmental factors, such as security configurations and user activity.

Browser data files seen accessed:

• \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<user profile uid>.default-release\cookies.sqlite
• \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<user profile uid>.default-release\formhistory.sqlite
• \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<user profile uid>.default-release\key4.db
• \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<user profile uid>.default-release\logins.json
• \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Web Data
• \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
• \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data

User data file paths seen accessed:

• C:\\Users\<user>\\OneDrive
• C:\\Users\<user>\\Documents
• C:\\Users\<user>\\Downloads

Third-stage PowerShell analysis

If a PowerShell script is also dropped by the second-stage payload, it includes Base64-obfuscated commands to conduct actions, such as use curl to download additional files like NetSupport from the C2, create persistence for the NetSupport RAT, and exfiltrate system information to C2 servers. To ensure no errors or the progress meter is displayed on the compromised device, the curl command is often used with the –silent option when downloading files from the C2. PowerShell is often configured to run without restrictions with the -ExecutionPolicy Bypass parameter.

As an example, in some of the incidents, when the second-stage payload runs, a PowerShell script is dropped and executed. The script sends the compromised device’s name to the C2 and downloads NetSupport RAT from the same C2.

• Second-stage payload: Squarel.exe
• PowerShell script: SHA-256: d70ccae7914fc8c36c9e11b2a7f10bebd7f5696e78d8836554f4990b0f688dbb
• C2 domain: keikochio[.]com
• NetSupport RAT: SHA-256: 32a828e2060e92b799829a12e3e87730e9a88ecfa65a4fc4700bdcc57a52d995

In another case, a second-stage payload drops a PowerShell script, which connects to hxxps://ipinfo[.]io to gather the compromised device’s external-facing IP address. This information is sent to a Telegram chat, then drops presentationhost.exe (a renamed NetSupport binary) and remcmdstub.exe (NetSupport Command Manager) into the %TEMP% directory. Finally, the PowerShell script establishes persistence for presentationhost.exe by adding it to the auto-start extensibility points (ASEP) registry keys. When it runs, the NetSupport RAT connects to the C2 and captures a screenshot of the compromised device’s desktop. It also delivers a Lumma executable that drops a VBScript file with the same name. The VBScript file runs encoded PowerShell to initiate C2 connections and launches MSBuild.exe to enable Chrome remote debugging on a hidden desktop. Additionally, presentationhost.exe initiates remcmdstub.exe, which leverages iScrPaint.exe (iTop Screen Recorder) to run MSBuild.exe and access browser credential files for exfiltration. The iScrPaint.exe file also establishes persistence by placing a .lnk shortcut in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring it runs on system reboot.

• Second-stage payload: Application.exe
• PowerShell script: SHA-256: 483796a64f004a684a7bc20c1ddd5c671b41a808bc77634112e1703052666a64
• C2: hxxp://5.10.250[.]240/fakeurl.htm

The last observed third-stage PowerShell script was dropped by three second-stage payloads. The script sends the compromised device’s name to the C2 server. It then changes the working directory to $env:APPDATA, before using Start-BitsTransfer to download NetSupport from the C2. To evade detection, it modifies system security settings forcing TLS1.2 for encrypted C2 communication. These files are extracted into a newly created WinLibraryClient directory under AppData and then are launched. The script establishes persistence for the client32.exe (NetSupport RAT) by modifying the ASEP registry. Client32.exe initiates C2 connections to hxxp://79.132.128[.]77/fakeurl.htm.

• Second-stage payloads: SalmonSamurai.exe, LakerBaker.exe, and DisplayPhotoViewer.exe
• PowerShell script: SHA-256: 670218cfc5c16d06762b6bc74cda4902087d812e72c52d6b9077c4c4164856b6
• C2 domain: stocktemplates[.]net

Additionally, one observed execution included registry enumeration of HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\ to identify installed applications and security software. It also queries the system’s domain status using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and scans for cryptocurrency wallets, including Ledger Live, Trezor Suite, KeepKey, BCVault, OneKey, and BitBox, indicating potential financial data theft.

Fourth-stage PowerShell analysis

Depending on the .com file that ran (like Briefly.com), the renamed AutoIT file may drop a PowerShell script (SHA-256: 2a29c9904d1860ea3177da7553c8b1bf1944566e5bc1e71340d9e0ff079f0bd3). The obfuscated PowerShell code uses the Add-MpPreference cmdlet to modify Microsoft Defender to add in exclusion paths for Microsoft Defender, so the specified folders are not scanned.

The script above is sometimes followed by an instance of Base64-encoded PowerShell commands. The PowerShell commands perform the following actions:

• Sends a web request to hxxps://360[.]net and closes the response.
• Sends a web request to hxxps://baidu[.]com and closes the response.
• Downloads data from hxxps://klipcatepiu0[.]shop/int_clp_sha.txt using a web client.
• Writes the downloaded data to a memory stream and saves it as a .zip file named null.zip (SHA-256: f07b8e5622598c228bfc9bff50838a3c4fffd88c436a7ef77e6214a40b0a2bae) in the C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Local\Temp directory.

Recommendations

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat.

Strengthen Microsoft Defender for Endpoint configuration

• Ensure that tamper protection is enabled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. 
• Enable network protection in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. 
• Turn on web protection.
• Run endpoint detection and response (EDR) in block mode so that Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can block malicious artifacts, even when your non-Microsoft antivirus does not detect the threat or when Microsoft Defender Antivirus is running in passive mode. EDR in block mode works behind the scenes to remediate malicious artifacts that are detected post-breach.     
• Configure investigation and remediation in full automated mode to let Microsoft Defender for Endpoint take immediate action on alerts to resolve breaches, significantly reducing alert volume.  
• Microsoft Defender XDR customers can turn on the following attack surface reduction rules to prevent common attack techniques used by threat actors. 
  • Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion 
  • Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
  • Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
  • Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
  • Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem 
  • Block use of copied or impersonated system tools

Strengthen operating environment configuration

• Require multifactor authentication (MFA). While certain attacks such as adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attempt to circumvent MFA, implementation of MFA remains an essential pillar in identity security and is highly effective at stopping a variety of threats.
  • Leverage phishing-resistant authentication methods such as FIDO Tokens, or Microsoft Authenticator with passkey. Avoid telephony-based MFA methods to avoid risks associated with SIM-jacking.
• Implement Entra ID Conditional Access authentication strength to require phishing-resistant authentication for employees and external users for critical apps.
• Encourage users to use Microsoft Edge and other web browsers that support Microsoft Defender SmartScreen, which identifies and blocks malicious websites, including phishing sites, scam sites, and sites that host malware.
• Enable Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Service connections.
• Enable Local Security Authority (LSA) protection to block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem. 
• AppLocker can restrict specific software tools prohibited within the organization, such as reconnaissance, fingerprinting, and RMM tools, or grant access to only specific users.

Microsoft Defender XDR detections

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender XDR coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.

Customers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects threat components as the following malware:

• Trojan:Win64/LummaStealer
• Trojan:Win32/Malgent
• Behavior:Win32/Eldorado
• Behavior:Win32/LuammaStealer
• Trojan:PowerShell/Powdow
• Trojan:Win64/Shaolaod
• Behavior:Win64/Shaolaod

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

The following alerts might indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• Possible theft of passwords and other sensitive web browser information
• Possible Lumma Stealer activity
• Renamed AutoIt tool
• Use of living-off-the-land binary to run malicious code
• Suspicious startup item creation
• Suspicious Scheduled Task Process Launched
• Suspicious DPAPI Activity
• Suspicious implant process from a known emerging threat
• Security software tampering
• Suspicious activity linked to a financially motivated threat actor detected
• Ransomware-linked threat actor detected
• A file or network connection related to a ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group detected
• Information stealing malware activity
• Possible NetSupport Manager activity
• Suspicious sequence of exploration activities
• Defender detection bypass
• Suspicious Location of Remote Management Software
• A process was injected with potentially malicious code
• Process hollowing detected
• Suspicious PowerShell download or encoded command execution
• Suspicious PowerShell command line
• Suspicious behavior by cmd.exe was observed
• Suspicious Security Software Discovery
• Suspicious discovery indicative of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
• A process was launched on a hidden desktop
• Monitored keystrokes
• Suspicious Process Discovery
• Suspicious Javascript process
• A suspicious file was observed
• Anomaly detected in ASEP registry

Microsoft Defender for Cloud

The following alerts might indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• Detected suspicious combination of HTA and PowerShell
• Suspicious PowerShell Activity Detected
• Traffic detected from IP addresses recommended for blocking
• Attempted communication with suspicious sinkholed domain
• Communication with suspicious domain identified by threat intelligence
• Detected obfuscated command line
• Detected suspicious named pipe communications

Microsoft Security Copilot

Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following pre-built promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:

• Incident investigation
• Microsoft User analysis
• Threat actor profile
• Threat Intelligence 360 report based on MDTI article
• Vulnerability impact assessment

Note that some promptbooks require access to plugins for Microsoft products such as Microsoft Defender XDR or Microsoft Sentinel.

Threat intelligence reports

Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.

Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence

• Storm-0408
• Agent Tesla credential theft malware
• Information stealers
• Lumma stealer
• Abuse of remote monitoring and management tools
• Malicious use of PowerShell

Microsoft Security Copilot customers can also use the Microsoft Security Copilot integration in Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence, either in the Security Copilot standalone portal or in the embedded experience in the Microsoft Defender portal to get more information about this threat actor.

Hunting queries

Microsoft Defender XDR

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can run the following query to find related activity in their networks:

Github-hosted first-stage payload certificate serial numbers

let specificSerialNumbers = dynamic(["70093af339876742820d7941", "15042512e67e8275f3f7f36b", "5608cab7e2ce34d53abcbb73",
 "0fa27d2553f24da79d1cc6bd8773ee9a", "7a7bf2ae0cbc0f5500db2946", "30d6c83a715bddb32e7956fe52d6b352",
  "301385aa36fae635e74bb88e", "30013cbbb16a7fd3c57f82707fb99c32", "5d00264a6b804ae6b28d9b16",
   "3a9c76f8304f77bd271921d9982f1ab6", "01f2c6c363767056abd80e9c", "0b09c88c0c8d15bed51a9eb4440f4bb0"]); 
union
(
    DeviceFileCertificateInfo
    | where CertificateSerialNumber in (specificSerialNumbers)
    | project DeviceName, CertificateSerialNumber, Signer, SHA1, IsSigned, Issuer, Timestamp
),
(
    DeviceTvmCertificateInfo
    | where SerialNumber in (specificSerialNumbers)
    | project DeviceId, SerialNumber, SignatureAlgorithm, Thumbprint, Path, IssueDate, ExpirationDate
)

Dropbox-hosted first-stage payload certificate serial number

Surface devices that may contain first-stage payloads hosted on Dropbox related to this activity. This query will search for the unique serial number of the known certificate related to this activity.

let specificSerialNumbers = dynamic(["7a7bf2ae0cbc0f5500db2946"]); 
union
(
    DeviceFileCertificateInfo
    | where CertificateSerialNumber in (specificSerialNumbers)
    | project DeviceName, CertificateSerialNumber, Signer, SHA1, IsSigned, Issuer, Timestamp
),
(
    DeviceTvmCertificateInfo
    | where SerialNumber in (specificSerialNumbers)
    | project DeviceId, SerialNumber, SignatureAlgorithm, Thumbprint, Path, IssueDate, ExpirationDate
)

Second-stage C2 IP addresses

Surface devices that may have communicated with second stage C2 IP addresses related to this activity.

let ipAddressToSearch = dynamic(["159.100.18.192", "192.142.10.246", "79.133.46.35", "84.200.24.191", "84.200.24.26", "89.187.28.253", "185.92.181.1"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(
    AzureDiagnostics
    | where identity_claim_ipaddr_s == ipAddressToSearch or conditions_sourceIP_s == ipAddressToSearch or CallerIPAddress == ipAddressToSearch or clientIP_s == ipAddressToSearch or clientIp_s == ipAddressToSearch or primaryIPv4Address_s == ipAddressToSearch or conditions_destinationIP_s == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "AzureDiagnostics", IPAddress = coalesce(identity_claim_ipaddr_s, conditions_sourceIP_s, CallerIPAddress, clientIP_s, clientIp_s, primaryIPv4Address_s, conditions_destinationIP_s), AdditionalInfo = tostring(AdditionalFields)
),
(
    IdentityQueryEvents
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch or DestinationIPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "IdentityQueryEvents", IPAddress = coalesce(IPAddress, DestinationIPAddress), AdditionalInfo = Query
),
(
    AADSignInEventsBeta
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "AADSignInEventsBeta", IPAddress, AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
),
(
    Heartbeat
    | where ComputerIP == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "Heartbeat", IPAddress = ComputerIP, AdditionalInfo = OSName
),
(
    CloudAppEvents
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "CloudAppEvents", IPAddress, AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
),
(
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where LocalIP == ipAddressToSearch or RemoteIP == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "DeviceNetworkEvents", IPAddress = coalesce(LocalIP, RemoteIP), AdditionalInfo = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
),
(
    AADUserRiskEvents
    | where IpAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "AADUserRiskEvents", IPAddress = IpAddress, AdditionalInfo = RiskEventType
),
(
    AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs", IPAddress, AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
),
(
    MicrosoftAzureBastionAuditLogs
    | where TargetVMIPAddress == ipAddressToSearch or ClientIpAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "MicrosoftAzureBastionAuditLogs", IPAddress = coalesce(TargetVMIPAddress, ClientIpAddress), AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
)
| sort by Timestamp desc

Fourth-stage C2 IP addresses

Surface devices that may have communicated with fourth stage C2 IP addresses related to this activity.

let ipAddressToSearch = dynamic(["45.141.84.60", "91.202.233.18", "154.216.20.131", "5.10.250.240", "79.132.128.77"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(
    AzureDiagnostics
    | where identity_claim_ipaddr_s == ipAddressToSearch or conditions_sourceIP_s == ipAddressToSearch or CallerIPAddress == ipAddressToSearch or clientIP_s == ipAddressToSearch or clientIp_s == ipAddressToSearch or primaryIPv4Address_s == ipAddressToSearch or conditions_destinationIP_s == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "AzureDiagnostics", IPAddress = coalesce(identity_claim_ipaddr_s, conditions_sourceIP_s, CallerIPAddress, clientIP_s, clientIp_s, primaryIPv4Address_s, o),
(
    IdentityQueryEvents
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch or DestinationIPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "IdentityQueryEvents", IPAddress = coalesce(IPAddress, DestinationIPAddress), AdditionalInfo = Query
),
(
    AADSignInEventsBeta
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "AADSignInEventsBeta", IPAddress, AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
),
(
    Heartbeat
    | where ComputerIP == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "Heartbeat", IPAddress = ComputerIP, AdditionalInfo = OSName
),
(
    CloudAppEvents
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "CloudAppEvents", IPAddress, AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
),
(
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where LocalIP == ipAddressToSearch or RemoteIP == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp, Table = "DeviceNetworkEvents", IPAddress = coalesce(LocalIP, RemoteIP), AdditionalInfo = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
),
(
    AADUserRiskEvents
    | where IpAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "AADUserRiskEvents", IPAddress = IpAddress, AdditionalInfo = RiskEventType
),
(
    AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
    | where IPAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs", IPAddress, AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
),
(
    MicrosoftAzureBastionAuditLogs
    | where TargetVMIPAddress == ipAddressToSearch or ClientIpAddress == ipAddressToSearch
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Table = "MicrosoftAzureBastionAuditLogs", IPAddress = coalesce(TargetVMIPAddress, ClientIpAddress), AdditionalInfo = UserAgent
)
| sort by Timestamp desc

Browser remote debugging 

Identify AutoIT scripts launching chromium-based browsers (such as chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe) in remote debugging mode.

DeviceProcessEvents 
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == "AutoIt3.exe" // Check for "AutoIt" scripts, even if it's renamed.  
| where ProcessCommandLine has "--remote-debugging-port" // Identify Chromium based browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe etc) being launched in remote debugging mode. 
| project DeviceId, Timestamp, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

DPAPI decryption via AutoIT

Identify DPAPI decryption activity originating from AutoIT scripts.

DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "DpapiAccessed"
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == "AutoIt3.exe"
| where (AdditionalFields has_any("Google Chrome", "Microsoft Edge") and AdditionalFields has_any("SPCryptUnprotect"))
| extend json = parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend dataDesp = tostring(json.DataDescription.PropertyValue)
| extend opType = tostring(json.OperationType.PropertyValue)
| where (dataDesp in~ ("Google Chrome", "Microsoft Edge") and opType =~ "SPCryptUnprotect")
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, ActionType, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields, dataDesp, opType

DPAPI decryption via LOLBAS binaries

Identify DPAPI decryption activity originating from LOLBAS binaries (RegAsm.exe and MSBuild.exe).

DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "DpapiAccessed"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("RegAsm.exe", "MSBuild.exe")
| where (AdditionalFields has_any("Google Chrome", "Microsoft Edge") and  AdditionalFields has_any("SPCryptUnprotect"))
| extend json = parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend dataDesp = tostring(json.DataDescription.PropertyValue)
| extend opType = tostring(json.OperationType.PropertyValue)
| where (dataDesp in~ ("Google Chrome", "Microsoft Edge") and opType =~ "SPCryptUnprotect")
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, ActionType, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AdditionalFields, dataDesp, opType

Sensitive browser file access via AutoIT

Identify AutoIT scripts (renamed or otherwise) accessing sensitive browser files.

let browserDirs = pack_array(@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\"); 
let browserSensitiveFiles = pack_array("Web Data", "Login Data", "key4.db", "formhistory.sqlite", "cookies.sqlite", "logins.json", "places.sqlite", "cert9.db");
DeviceEvents
| where AdditionalFields has_any ("FileOpenSource") // Filter for "File Open" events.
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName == "AutoIt3.exe"
| where (AdditionalFields has_any(browserDirs) or  AdditionalFields has_any(browserSensitiveFiles)) 
| extend json = parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend File_Name = tostring(json.FileName.PropertyValue)
| where (File_Name has_any (browserDirs) and File_Name has_any (browserSensitiveFiles))
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, File_Name

Sensitive browser file access via LOLBAS binaries

Identify LOLBAS binaries (RegAsm.exe and MSBuild.exe) accessing sensitive browser files.

let browserDirs = pack_array(@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\"); 
let browserSensitiveFiles = pack_array("Web Data", "Login Data", "key4.db", "formhistory.sqlite", "cookies.sqlite", "logins.json", "places.sqlite", "cert9.db");
DeviceEvents
| where AdditionalFields has_any ("FileOpenSource") // Filter for "File Open" events.
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("RegAsm.exe", "MSBuild.exe")
 | where (AdditionalFields has_any(browserDirs) or  AdditionalFields has_any(browserSensitiveFiles)) 
| extend json = parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend File_Name = tostring(json.FileName.PropertyValue)
| where (File_Name has_any (browserDirs) and File_Name has_any (browserSensitiveFiles))
| project Timestamp, ReportId, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, File_Name

Microsoft Sentinel

Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace.

Indicators of compromise

Streaming website domains with malicious iframe

Malicious iframe redirector domains

Malvertisement distributor

Malvertising website domains

GitHub referral URLs

GitHub URLs

DropBox URL

Discord URL

First stage GitHub-hosted payloads

First-stage Dropbox-hosted payload

First-stage Discord-hosted payload

Certificate signatures of GitHub-hosted payloads

Certificate signature of Dropbox-hosted payload

Second-stage payloads

Second-stage C2s

Third-stage payloads: .exe and PowerShell files

Fourth-stage AutoIT, NetSupport RAT, PowerShell, and Lumma

Third-stage C2s

Fourth-stage C2s

Fourth-stage testing connectivity sites

References

• https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Element/iframe
• https://github.com/antivirusevasion69/doenerium
• https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html#-s
• https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2a29c9904d1860ea3177da7553c8b1bf1944566e5bc1e71340d9e0ff079f0bd3

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: https://aka.ms/threatintelblog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/microsoft-threat-intelligence, and on X (formerly Twitter) at https://x.com/MsftSecIntel.

Hear more about this discovery and how threat actors in this campaign leverage trusted platforms and advanced techniques to achieve their malicious goals in this episode of the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast, hosted by Sherrod DeGrippo: https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence/39/notes. To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast: https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence.

The post Malvertising campaign leads to info stealers hosted on GitHub appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

While there are new vendors launching MDR services regularly, many security teams are turning to Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR, a recognized leader, to deliver comprehensive coverage.¹ Employed worldwide by organizations across industries, Microsoft’s team of dedicated experts proactively hunts for cyberthreats and triages, investigates, and responds to incidents on a customer’s behalf around the clock across their most critical assets. Our proven service brings together in-house security professionals and industry-leading protection with Microsoft Defender XDR to help security teams rapidly stop cyberthreats and keep their environments secure.² 

Frost & Sullivan names Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR a leader in the Frost Radar™ Managed Detection and Response for 2024.¹ 

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

Give your security operations center team coverage with end-to-end protection and expertise.

Learn more

Reduce the staffing burden, improve security coverage, and focus on other priorities

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR improves operational efficacy greatly while elevating an organization’s security posture to a new level. The team of experts will monitor the environment, find and halt cyberthreats, and help contain incidents faster with human-led response and remediation. With Defender Experts for XDR, organizations will expand their threat protection capabilities, reduce the number of incidents over time, and have more resources to focus on other priorities.

More experts on your side

Scaling in-house security teams remains challenging. Security experts are not only scarce but expensive. The persistent gap in open security positions has widened to 25% since 2022, meaning one in four in-house security analyst positions will remain unfilled.³ In the Forrester Consulting New Technology Project Total Economic Impact study, without Defender Experts for XDR, the in-house team size for the composite organization would need to increase by up to 30% in mid-impact scenario or 40% in high-impact scenario in year one to provide the same level of threat detection service.⁴ When you consider the lack of available security talent, increasing an in-house team size by 40% poses significant security concerns to CISOs. Existing security team members won’t be able to perform all the tasks required. Many will be overworked, which may lead to burnout.

With more than 34,000 full-time equivalent security engineers, Microsoft is one of the largest security companies in the world. Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR reinforces your security team with Microsoft security professionals to help reduce talent gap concerns. In addition to the team of experts, customers have additional Microsoft security resources to help with onboarding, recommendations, and strategic insights.

“Microsoft has the assets and people I needed. All the technologies, Microsoft Azure, and a full software stack end-to-end, all combined together with the fabric of security. Microsoft [Defender Experts for XDR] has the people and the ability to hire and train those people with the most upmost skill set to deal with the issues we face.”

—Head of Cybersecurity Response Architecture, financial services industry

Accelerate and expand protection against today’s cyberthreats

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR deploys quickly. That’s welcome news to organizations concerned about maturing their security program and can’t wait for new staffing and capabilities to be developed in-house. Customers can quickly leverage the deep expertise of the Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR team to tackle the increasing number of sophisticated threats. 

CISOs and security teams know that phishing attacks continue to rise because cybercriminals are finding success. Email remains the most common method for phishing attacks, with 91% of all cyberattacks beginning with a phishing email. Phishing is the primary method for delivering ransomware, accounting for 45% of all ransomware attacks. Financial institutions are most targeted at 27.7% followed by nearly all other industries.⁵

According to internal Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR statistics, roughly 40% of halted threats are phishing.

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR is a managed extended detection and response service (MXDR). MXDR is an evolution of traditional MDR services, which primarily focuses on endpoints. Our MXDR service has greater protection across endpoints, email and productivity tools, identities, and cloud apps—ensuring the detection and disruption of many cyberthreats, such as phishing, that would not be covered by endpoint-only managed services. That expanded and consolidated coverage enables Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR to find even the most emergent threats. For example, our in-house team identified and disrupted a significant Octo Tempest operation that was working across previously siloed domains. 

The reduction in the likelihood of breaches with Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR is roughly 20% and is worth $261,000 to $522,000 over three years with Defender Experts.⁴

In addition to detecting, triaging, and responding to cyberthreats, Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR publishes insights to keep organizations secure. That includes recent blogs on file hosting services abuse and phishing abuse of remote monitoring and management tools. As well, the MXDR service vetted roughly 45 indicators related to adversary-in-the-middle, password spray, and multifactor authentication fatigue and added them to Spectre to help keep organizations secure.

From September 2024 through November 2024, Microsoft Security published multiple cyberthreat articles covering real-world exploration topics such as Roadtools, AzureHound, Fake Palo Alto GlobalProtect, AsyncRAT via ScreenConnect, Specula C2 Framework, SectopRAT campaign, Selenium Grid for Cryptomining, and Specula.

“The Microsoft MXDR service, Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR, is helping our SOC team around the clock and taking our security posture to the next level. On our second day of using the service, there was an alert we had previously dismissed, but Microsoft continued the investigation and identified a machine in our environment that was open to the internet. It was created by a threat actor using a remote desktop protocol (RDP). Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR’s MXDR investigation and response to remediate the issue was immediately valuable to us.”

—Director of Security Operations, financial services industry

Halt cyberthreats before they do damage

In 2024 the mean time for the average organization to identify a breach was 194 days and containment 64 days.⁶  Organizations must proactively look for cyberattackers across unified cross-domain telemetry versus relying solely on disparate product alerts. Proactive threat hunting is no longer a nice-to-have in an organization’s security practice. It’s a must-have to detect cyberthreats faster before they can do significant harm.

When every minute counts, Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR can help speed up the detection of an intrusion with proactive threat hunting informed by Microsoft’s threat intelligence, which tracks more than 1,500 unique cyberthreat groups and correlates insights from 78 trillion security signals per day.⁷

Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting proactively looks for threats around the clock across endpoints, email, identity, and cloud apps using Microsoft Defender and other signals. Threat hunting leverages advanced AI and human expertise to probe deeper and rapidly correlate and expose cyberthreats across an organization’s security stack. With visibility across diverse, cross-domain telemetry and threat intelligence, Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting extends in-house threat hunting capabilities to provide an additional layer of threat detection to improve a SOC’s overall threat response and security efficacy.

In a recent survey, 63% of organizations saw a measurable improvement in their security posture with threat hunting. 49% saw a reduction in network and endpoint attacks along with more accurate threat detection and a reduction of false positives.⁸

Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting enables organizations to detect and mitigate cyberthreats such as advanced persistent threats or zero-day vulnerabilities. By actively seeking out hidden risks and reducing dwell time, threat hunting minimizes potential damage, enhances incident response, and strengthens overall security posture.

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR, which includes Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting, allows customers to stay ahead of sophisticated threat actors, uncover gaps in defenses, and adapt to an ever-evolving cyberthreat landscape.

“Managed threat hunting services detect and address security threats before they become major incidents, reducing potential damage. By implementing this (Defender Experts for Hunting), we enhance our cybersecurity posture by having experts who continuously look for hidden threats, ensuring the safety of our data, reputation, and customer trust.”

—CISO, technology industry

Spend less to get more

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR helps CISOs do more with their security budgets. According to a 2024 Forrester Total Economic Impact™ study, Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR generated a project return on investment (ROI) of up to 254% with a projected net present value of up to $6.1 million for the profiled composite company.⁴

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR includes trusted advisors who provide insights on operationalizing Microsoft Defender XDR for optimal security efficacy. This helps reduce the burden on in-house security and IT teams so they can focus on other projects.

Beyond lowering security operations costs, the Forrester study noted Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR efficiency gains for surveyed customers, including a 49% decrease in security-related IT help desk tickets. Other productivity gains included freeing up 42% of available full time employee hours and lowering general IT security-related project hours by 20%.⁴

Learn how Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR can improve organizational security

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR is Microsoft’s MXDR service. It delivers round-the-clock threat detection, investigation, and response capabilities, along with proactive threat hunting. Designed to help close the security talent gap and enhance organizational security postures, the MXDR service combines Microsoft’s advanced Microsoft Defender XDR capabilities with dedicated security experts to tackle cyberthreats like phishing, ransomware, and zero-day vulnerabilities. Offering rapid deployment, significant ROI (254%, as per Forrester), and operational efficiencies, Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR reduces incident and alerts volume, improves the security posture, and frees up in-house resources. Organizations worldwide benefit from these scalable solutions, leveraging Microsoft’s threat intelligence and security expertise to stay ahead of evolving cyberthreats.

To learn more, please visit Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR or contact your Microsoft security representative.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

¹Frost & Sullivan names Microsoft a Leader in the Frost Radar™: Managed Detection and Response, 2024, Srikanth Shoroff. March 25, 2024.

²Microsoft a Leader in the Forrester Wave for XDR, Microsoft Security Blog. June 3, 2024.

³ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Report, 2024.

⁴Forrester Consulting study commissioned by Microsoft, 2024, New Technology: The Projected Total Economic Impact™ of Microsoft Defender Experts For XDR.

⁵2024 Phishing Facts and Statistics, Identitytheft.org.

⁶Time to identify and contain data breaches global 2024, Statista.

⁷Microsoft Digital Defense Report, 2024.

⁸SANS 2024 Threat Hunting Survey, March 19, 2024.

The post Why security teams rely on Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR for managed detection and response appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Legitimate hosting services, such as SharePoint, OneDrive, and Dropbox, are widely used by organizations for storing, sharing, and collaborating on files. However, the widespread use of such services also makes them attractive targets for threat actors, who exploit the trust and familiarity associated with these services to deliver malicious files and links, often avoiding detection by traditional security measures.

Importantly, Microsoft takes action against malicious users violating the Microsoft Services Agreement in how they use apps like SharePoint and OneDrive. To help protect enterprise accounts from compromise, by default both Microsoft 365 and Office 365 support multi-factor authentication (MFA) and passwordless sign-in. Consumers can also go passwordless with their Microsoft account. Because security is a team sport, Microsoft also works with third parties like Dropbox to share threat intelligence and protect mutual customers and the wider community.

In this blog, we discuss the typical attack chain used in campaigns misusing file hosting services and detail the recently observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including the increasing use of certain defense evasion tactics. To help defenders protect their identities and data, we also share mitigation guidance to help reduce the impact of this threat, and detection details and hunting queries to locate potential misuse of file hosting services and related threat actor activities. By understanding these evolving threats and implementing the recommended mitigations, organizations can better protect themselves against these sophisticated campaigns and safeguard digital assets.

Attack overview

Phishing campaigns exploiting legitimate file hosting services have been trending throughout the last few years, especially due to the relative ease of the technique. The files are delivered through different approaches, including email and email attachments like PDFs, OneNote, and Word files, with the intent of compromising identities or devices. These campaigns are different from traditional phishing attacks because of the sophisticated defense evasion techniques used.

Since mid-April 2024, we observed threat actors increasingly use these tactics aimed at circumventing defense mechanisms:

• Files with restricted access: The files sent through the phishing emails are configured to be accessible solely to the designated recipient. This requires the recipient to be signed in to the file-sharing service—be it Dropbox, OneDrive, or SharePoint—or to re-authenticate by entering their email address along with a one-time password (OTP) received through a notification service.
• Files with view-only restrictions: To bypass analysis by email detonation systems, the files shared in these phishing attacks are set to ‘view-only’ mode, disabling the ability to download and consequently, the detection of embedded URLs within the file.

An example attack chain is provided below, depicting the updated defense evasion techniques being used across stages 4, 5, and 6:

Initial access

The attack typically begins with the compromise of a user within a trusted vendor. After compromising the trusted vendor, the threat actor hosts a file on the vendor’s file hosting service, which is then shared with a target organization. This misuse of legitimate file hosting services is particularly effective because recipients are more likely to trust emails from known vendors, allowing threat actors to bypass security measures and compromise identities. Often, users from trusted vendors are added to allow lists through policies set by the organization on Exchange Online products, enabling phishing emails to be successfully delivered.

While file names observed in these campaigns also included the recipients, the hosted files typically follow these patterns:

• Familiar topics based on existing conversations
  • For example, if the two organizations have prior interactions related to an audit, the shared files could be named “Audit Report 2024”.
• Familiar topics based on current context
  • If the attack has not originated from a trusted vendor, the threat actor often impersonates administrators or help desk or IT support personnel in the sender display name and uses a file name such as “IT Filing Support 2024”, “Forms related to Tax submission”, or “Troubleshooting guidelines”.
• Topics based on urgency
  • Another common technique observed by the threat actors creating these files is that they create a sense of urgency with the file names like “Urgent:Attention Required” and “Compromised Password Reset”.

Defense evasion techniques

Once the threat actor shares the files on the file hosting service with the intended users, the file hosting service sends the target user an automated email notification with a link to access the file securely. This email is not a phishing email but a notification for the user about the sharing action. In scenarios involving SharePoint or OneDrive, the file is shared from the user’s context, with the compromised user’s email address as the sender. However, in the Dropbox scenario, the file is shared from no-reply@dropbox[.]com. The files are shared through automated notification emails with the subject: “<User> shared <document> with you”. To evade detections, the threat actor deploys the following additional techniques:

• Only the intended recipient can access the file
  • The intended recipient needs to re-authenticate before accessing the file
  • The file is accessible only for a limited time window
• The PDF shared in the file cannot be downloaded

These techniques make detonation and analysis of the sample with the malicious link almost impossible since they are restricted.

Identity compromise

When the targeted user accesses the shared file, the user is prompted to verify their identity by providing their email address:

Next, an OTP is sent from no-reply@notify.microsoft[.]com. Once the OTP is submitted, the user is successfully authorized and can view a document, often masquerading as a preview, with a malicious link, which is another lure to make the targeted user click the “View my message” access link.

This link redirects the user to an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing page, where the user is prompted to provide the password and complete multifactor authentication (MFA). The compromised token can then be leveraged by the threat actor to perform the second stage BEC attack and continue the campaign.

Recommended actions

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat:

• Enable Conditional Access policies in Microsoft Entra, especially risk-based access policies. Conditional access policies evaluate sign-in requests using additional identity-driven signals like user or group membership, IP address location information, and device status, among others, are enforced for suspicious sign-ins. Organizations can protect themselves from attacks that leverage stolen credentials by enabling policies such as compliant devices, Azure trusted IP address requirements, or risk-based policies with proper access control. If you are still evaluating Conditional Access, use security defaults as an initial baseline set of policies to improve identity security posture.
• Implement continuous access evaluation.
• Implement Microsoft Entra passwordless sign-in with FIDO2 security keys.
• Turn on network protection in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to block connections to malicious domains and IP addresses.
• Implement Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Mobile Threat Defense on mobile devices used to access enterprise assets.
• Leverage Microsoft Edge to automatically identify and block malicious websites, including those used in this phishing campaign, and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 to detect and block malicious emails, links, and files. Monitor suspicious or anomalous activities in Microsoft Entra ID Protection. Investigate sign-in attempts with suspicious characteristics (such as the location, ISP, user agent, and use of anonymizer services). Educate users about the risks of secure file sharing and emails from trusted vendors.

Appendix

Microsoft Defender XDR detections

Microsoft Defender XDR raises the following alerts by combining Microsoft Defender for Office 365 URL click and Microsoft Entra ID Protection risky sign-ins signal.

• Risky sign-in after clicking a possible AiTM phishing URL
• User compromised through session cookie hijack
• User compromised in a known AiTM phishing kit

Hunting queries

Microsoft Defender XDR 

The file sharing events related to the activity in this blog post can be audited through the CloudAppEvents telemetry. Microsoft Defender XDR customers can run the following query to find related activity in their networks: 

Automated email notifications and suspicious sign-in activity

By correlating the email from the Microsoft notification service or Dropbox automated notification service with a suspicious sign-in activity, we can identify compromises, especially from securely shared SharePoint or Dropbox files.

let usersWithSuspiciousEmails = EmailEvents
    | where SenderFromAddress in ("no-reply@notify.microsoft.com", "no-reply@dropbox.com") or InternetMessageId startswith "<OneTimePasscode"
    | where isnotempty(RecipientObjectId)
    | distinct RecipientObjectId;
AADSignInEventsBeta
| where AccountObjectId in (usersWithSuspiciousEmails)
| where RiskLevelDuringSignIn == 100

Files share contents and suspicious sign-in activity

In the majority of the campaigns, the file name involves a sense of urgency or content related to finance or credential updates. By correlating the file share emails with suspicious sign-ins, compromises can be detected. (For example: Alex shared “Password Reset Mandatory.pdf” with you). Since these are observed as campaigns, validating that the same file has been shared with multiple users in the organization can support the detection.

let usersWithSuspiciousEmails = EmailEvents
    | where Subject has_all ("shared", "with you")
    | where Subject has_any ("payment", "invoice", "urgent", "mandatory", "Payoff", "Wire", "Confirmation", "password")
    | where isnotempty(RecipientObjectId)
    | summarize RecipientCount = dcount(RecipientObjectId), RecipientList = make_set(RecipientObjectId) by Subject
    | where RecipientCount >= 10
    | mv-expand RecipientList to typeof(string)
    | distinct RecipientList;
AADSignInEventsBeta
| where AccountObjectId in (usersWithSuspiciousEmails)
| where RiskLevelDuringSignIn == 100

BEC: File sharing tactics based on the file hosting service used

To initiate the file sharing activity, these campaigns commonly use certain action types depending on the file hosting service being leveraged. Below are the action types from the audit logs recorded for the file sharing events. These action types can be used to hunt for activities related to these campaigns by replacing the action type for its respective application in the queries below this table.

OneDrive or SharePoint: The following query highlights that a specific file has been shared by a user with multiple participants. Correlating this activity with suspicious sign-in attempts preceding this can help identify lateral movements and BEC attacks.

let securelinkCreated = CloudAppEvents
    | where ActionType == "SecureLinkCreated"
    | project FileCreatedTime = Timestamp, AccountObjectId, ObjectName;
let filesCreated = securelinkCreated
    | where isnotempty(ObjectName)
    | distinct tostring(ObjectName);
CloudAppEvents
| where ActionType == "AddedToSecureLink"
| where Application in ("Microsoft SharePoint Online", "Microsoft OneDrive for Business")
| extend FileShared = tostring(RawEventData.ObjectId)
| where FileShared in (filesCreated)
| extend UserSharedWith = tostring(RawEventData.TargetUserOrGroupName)
| extend TypeofUserSharedWith = RawEventData.TargetUserOrGroupType
| where TypeofUserSharedWith == "Guest"
| where isnotempty(FileShared) and isnotempty(UserSharedWith)
| join kind=inner securelinkCreated on $left.FileShared==$right.ObjectName
// Secure file created recently (in the last 1day)
| where (Timestamp - FileCreatedTime) between (1d .. 0h)
| summarize NumofUsersSharedWith = dcount(UserSharedWith) by FileShared
| where NumofUsersSharedWith >= 20

Dropbox: The following query highlights that a file hosted on Dropbox has been shared with multiple participants.

CloudAppEvents
| where ActionType in ("Added users and/or groups to shared file/folder", "Invited user to Dropbox and added them to shared file/folder")
| where Application == "Dropbox"
| where ObjectType == "File"
| extend FileShared = tostring(ObjectName)
| where isnotempty(FileShared)
| mv-expand ActivityObjects
| where ActivityObjects.Type == "Account" and ActivityObjects.Role == "To"
| extend SharedBy = AccountId
| extend UserSharedWith = tostring(ActivityObjects.Name)
| summarize dcount(UserSharedWith) by FileShared, AccountObjectId
| where dcount_UserSharedWith >= 20

Microsoft Sentinel

Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the resources below to find related activities similar to those described in this post:

The following query identifies files with specific keywords that attackers might use in this campaign that have been shared through OneDrive or SharePoint using a Secure Link and accessed by over 10 unique users. It captures crucial details like target users, client IP addresses, timestamps, and file URLs to aid in detecting potential attacks:

let OperationName = dynamic(['SecureLinkCreated', 'AddedToSecureLink']);
OfficeActivity
| where Operation in (OperationName)
| where OfficeWorkload in ('OneDrive', 'SharePoint')
| where SourceFileName has_any ("payment", "invoice", "urgent", "mandatory", "Payoff", "Wire", "Confirmation", "password", "paycheck", "bank statement", "bank details", "closing", "funds", "bank account", "account details", "remittance", "deposit", "Reset")
| summarize CountOfShares = dcount(TargetUserOrGroupName), 
            make_list(TargetUserOrGroupName), 
            make_list(ClientIP), 
            make_list(TimeGenerated), 
            make_list(SourceRelativeUrl) by SourceFileName, OfficeWorkload
| where CountOfShares > 10

Considering that the attacker compromises users through AiTM,  possible AiTM phishing attempts can be detected through the below rule:

• Possible AiTM Phishing Attempt

In addition, customers can also use the following identity-focused queries to detect and investigate anomalous sign-in events that may be indicative of a compromised user identity being accessed by a threat actor:

• Signins From VPS Providers
• Signins from Nord VPN Providers
• Successful Signin From Non-Compliant Device

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: https://aka.ms/threatintelblog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/microsoft-threat-intelligence, and on X (formerly Twitter) at https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast: https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence.

The post File hosting services misused for identity phishing appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Defender Experts for XDR offers a range of capabilities: 

• Managed detection and response: Let our expert analysts manage your Microsoft Defender XDR incident queue and handle triage, investigation, and response on your behalf.  
• Proactive threat hunting: Extend your team’s threat hunting capabilities and prioritize significant threats with Defender Experts for Hunting built in. 
• Live dashboards and reports: Get a transparent view of our operations conducted on your behalf, along with a noise-free, actionable view of prioritized incidents and detailed analytics. 
• Proactive check-ins: Benefit from remote, periodic check-ins with your named service delivery manager (SDM) team to guide your MXDR experience and improve your security posture. 
• Fast and seamless onboarding: Get a guided baselining experience to ensure your Microsoft security products are correctly configured.

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

Give your security operations center (SOC) team coverage with leading end-to-end protection and expertise.

Learn more

Cyberattacks detected by Defender Experts for XDR

In the first cyberattack, Defender Experts for XDR provided detection, visibility, and coverage under what Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks as the threat actor Purple Typhoon. From the early steps in the intrusion, our team alerted the customer that 11 systems and 13 accounts were compromised via a malicious Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session, leveraging a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) Search Order Hijacking on a legitimate Notepad++ executable. As is common with this threat actor, the next cyberattack, established a Quasar RAT backdoor triggering keylogging, capturing credentials for the domain admin. After the loaders were executed, scheduled tasks were used to move laterally, execute discovery commands on internal network areas, and complete credential theft dumping.       

For the second cyberattack, which used BlackCat ransomware, Defender Experts for XDR detected and provided extensive guidance on investigation and remediation actions. The BlackCat ransomware, also known as ALPHV, is a prevalent cyberthreat and a prime example of the growing ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) gig economy. It’s noteworthy due to its unconventional programming language (Rust), multiple target devices and possible entry points, and affiliation with prolific threat activity groups. While BlackCat’s arrival and execution vary based on the actors deploying it, the outcome is the same—target data is encrypted, exfiltrated, and used for “double extortion,” where attackers threaten to release the stolen data to the public if the ransom isn’t paid. This attack used access broker credentials to perform lateral movement, exfiltrate sensitive data via privileged execution, and execute ransomware encryption malware.    

In both cyberattacks, our team focused on providing focused email, in-product focus to guide the customer, and in a real world cyberattack, our service and product would take disruption actions to stop the cyberattack.

Comprehensive threat hunting, managed response, and product detections 

With complex cyberattacks, security operations teams need robust guidance on what is happening and how to prioritize remediation efforts. Throughout this evaluation, we provided over 18 incidents, 196 alerts, and enriched product detections with human-driven guidance via email and in product experiences using Managed responses. This includes a detailed investigation summary, indicators of compromise (IOCs), advanced hunting queries (AHQs), and prioritized remediation actions to help contain the cyberthreat. Our world class hunting team focuses on providing initial response to a cyberattack, then iterations on updates based on new threat intelligence findings and other enrichment.   

Figure 1. The incident and alerts are tagged with Defender Experts and detailed analysis provided under view Managed response.

Figure 2. Managed response showing details of investigation summary, IOCs, and TTPs.

Figure 3. Managed response focused remediation one-click actions such as blocking indicator, stopping a malicious process, and resetting passwords.

AI-driven attack disruption with Microsoft Defender XDR   

As the second cyberattack leveraged BlackCat ransomware, Microsoft Defender XDR’s attack disruption capability automatically contained the threat and then followed up with hunter guidance on additional containment. This capability combines our industry-leading detection with AI-powered enforcement mechanisms to help mitigate cyberthreats early on in the cyberattack chain and contain their advancement. Analysts have a powerful tool against human-operated cyberattacks while leaving them in complete control of investigating, remediating, and bringing assets back online. 

Figure 4. A summary attack graph, managed responses and attack disruption automatically handling this ransomware threat.

Seamless alert prioritization and consolidation into notifications for the SOC 

We provide prioritization and focus for a typical customer’s SOC team using tags and incident titles with Defender Experts where we enrich product detections. In addition, a dedicated SDM will conduct periodic touchpoints with customers to share productivity and service metrics, provide insights on any vulnerabilities or changes in their environment, solicit feedback, and make best practices recommendations. Our customers see a reduction in total incident volume over time, improvements in security posture, and overall lower operational overhead. Learn how Defender Experts helps Westminster School.  

Figure 5. Summary of all incidents and Defender Experts tag to help filter and prioritize for customers.

Commitment to Microsoft MXDR partners 

We continue our commitment to support our partners in our Microsoft-verified MXDR program. We know that a single provider can’t meet the unique needs of every organization, so we frequently collaborate with our ecosystem of partners to provide customers the flexibility to choose what works best for them—and to leverage those trusted relationships for the best outcomes and returns on their investment. 

We acknowledge that there are areas for discussion and enhancement, but we will take these as a valuable learning opportunity to continuously improve our products and services for the customers we serve. We appreciate our ongoing collaboration with MITRE as the managed services evaluation process evolves with the growing cyberthreat landscape. We thank MITRE Engenuity for the opportunity to contribute to and participate in this year’s evaluation. 

Learn more about Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

To learn more, visit the Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR web page, read the Defender Experts for XDR docs page, and subscribe to our ongoing news at the Microsoft Security Experts blog. 

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​​To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity. 

© June 2024. The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. 

The post Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR recognized in the latest MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK® Evaluation for Managed Services appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

According to Frost & Sullivan, the market for MDR is growing rapidly, with a growth rate of 35.2%, as evidenced with 22 MDR vendors plotted in this year’s analysis. This growth is expected to continue as Frost & Sullivan cited that “faced with a lack of access to professionals and an inability to protect their business-critical data effectively, organizations are outsourcing to alleviate the issue.”

Figure 1. Frost Radar^TM for Managed Detection and Response 2024 showing Microsoft as a leader.

Advancing cybersecurity frontiers with Defender Experts

Designated as one of the companies to be considered first for investment, partnerships, or benchmarking by Frost & Sullivan, Microsoft is a recent entrant in the MDR space, but with its focus on AI and machine learning, “especially the development of Microsoft Copilot for Security, coupled with its top-tier threat detection and response capabilities, allows it to maintain an innovation edge over other world-class competitors.”¹ Our Defender Experts for XDR service helps our customers boost their security operations centers (SOCs) with security expertise and around-the-clock coverage to detect and accurately respond to incidents that matter across their varied Microsoft Defender XDR workloads.

The Frost & Sullivan report emphasizes the comprehensive capabilities of our Defender Experts for XDR service, which brings together human expertise with AI and automation powered by our Defender XDR suite. The service provides cross-domain MDR services with visibility over endpoints, email, cloud, and identity. In addition, Defender Experts for XDR “delivers 24/7 monitoring, detection, and response, and proactive threat hunting, combined with its world-class threat intelligence, security posture assessments, and access to its expert team.”

Charting new horizons—the convergence of managed services and generative AI

The report highlights the key innovation that Microsoft offers to customers, which is the ability to use both human-led expertise and generative AI in cybersecurity. As organizations continue to adopt MDR services to enhance their SOC efforts, the appearance of generative AI in cybersecurity solutions also offers more potential to those who want to improve their SOC teams. According to Frost & Sullivan, “AI, [machine learning], and automation have become increasingly integral to cybersecurity solutions. These technologies enhance detection and response and allow SOC analysts to focus on what’s important instead of chasing down false alerts.”

The report also recognizes Microsoft Copilot for Security as a pivotal AI assistant that enhances the capabilities of security analysts. It streamlines complex data into concise summaries, offers insights, aids in detection, accelerates response, and contextualizes alerts and incidents. This tool is instrumental in supporting both novice and seasoned analysts, enabling them to make well-informed decisions with greater confidence and speed.

Building on this, the Defender Experts team has found the utilization of Copilot for Security not only boosts productivity and streamlines workflows, but also significantly enhances threat detection and response. Insights from team leaders and real-world applications, such as script analysis and incident summaries, are detailed in a recent blog post. These examples underscore Copilot’s role in elevating the skills of analysts and enriching threat intelligence, and empowering security teams to leverage AI’s full potential in safeguarding their organizations. Microsoft will continue to invest in generative AI and unlock its potential for Defender Experts and our customers.

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

Give your security operations center team coverage with leading end-to-end protection and expertise.

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Empower your SOC with managed XDR

Frost & Sullivan’s report praises Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR for its capacity to expedite SOC operations through expert triage and investigation, provide robust protection through human-led response and proactive remediation, offer around-the-clock access to Defender Experts for real-time consultations, and provide strategic recommendations to fortify defenses and mitigate future cyberthreats, all underscored by the transformative integration of generative AI with human expertise.

We know that a single provider can’t meet the unique needs of every organization, so we frequently collaborate with our ecosystem of partners that provide customers the flexibility to choose what works for them—and to leverage those trusted relationships for the best outcomes and returns on their investment. To date, we’ve added more than 50 partners to our Microsoft-verified MXDR program and invite you to review their offerings.

Learn more

To learn more about our service, visit the Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR web page, read the Defender Experts for XDR docs page, and subscribe to our ongoing news at the Microsoft Security Experts blog home.

Cybersecurity and AI news

Discover the latest trends and best practices in cyberthreat protection and AI for cybersecurity.

Get the latest resources

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

¹Frost & Sullivan, Frost Radar™: Managed Detection and Response, 2024, Lucas Ferreyra. March 2024.

The post ​​Frost & Sullivan names Microsoft a Leader in the Frost Radar™: Managed Detection and Response, 2024 appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Our own Microsoft Defender Experts team has been using and exploring Copilot, and finding new ways it can streamline, inform, and optimize their daily work—from improving communication clarity to data analysis and upskilling. Through their work on the Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR service, they serve as an extension of our customers’ security operations center (SOC) teams. They proactively hunt for serious cyberthreats using Microsoft Defender data. They triage, investigate, and expose advanced threats, identify the scope and impact of malicious activity, and then take action on a customer’s behalf to remediate the incident. And now with Copilot, Defender Experts have a powerful new security tool.

Microsoft Copilot for Security

Powerful new capabilities, new integrations, and industry-leading generative AI.

Learn more

A leadership view of Copilot for Security

In this new series of short videos, our Defender Experts share real-world scenarios where Copilot is helping them navigate threat detection, investigation, and managed response. To begin, Ryan Kivett, Partner Group Manager for Defender Experts, Microsoft, shares his leadership view on how Copilot helps support learning and career growth for his team. Then Brian Hooper, Principal Research Lead for Defender Experts, Microsoft, talks about how Copilot can help minimize the mundane tasks that take security analysts away from their most important work—serious threat investigations.

Watch the video “A leadership view on deploying Copilot.”

Save time and increase efficiency

From a leadership level, it’s easy to see the potential of Copilot. But when every second counts—like during an active security incident—that potential needs to be fully realized and actionable. Copilot for Security puts critical guidance and context into the hands of your security team so they can respond to incidents in minutes instead of hours or days. In our next video clip, Phoebe Rogers, a senior member of the Microsoft Defender Experts analyst team, shares how Copilot helps her shave minutes off every script analysis—which adds up to real saved time, increased efficiency and understanding, and greater incident insight. Watch as she shares how she uses Copilot to analyze a suspicious script, step by step.

Watch the video “Script Analysis.”

When security analysts communicate with customers, they need to provide a clear, concise, and comprehensive summary of an active incident in a timely manner, so customers have a deep understanding of the situation. In the following video, Brian Hooper shares a detailed walkthrough of how Copilot is helping analysts write up these incident narratives 90% faster than in the past.

Watch the video “Incident Summaries.”

Upskill junior analysts and develop critical expertise

Most complex and sophisticated attacks like ransomware evade detection through numerous ways, including the use of scripts and PowerShell. Moreover, these scripts are often obfuscated, which adds to the complexity of detection and analysis. In our next video, Brian Hooper shows how the detailed, line-by-line script examination in Copilot allows security analysts to quickly assess and identify a script as malicious or benign. It also helps junior security analysts upskill their expertise. With Copilot, any analyst can use natural language prompts to initiate and perform tasks that they may not have a lot of experience with or expertise in, and the outputs of Copilot will help them both accomplish the right results quickly, and, more importantly, help them develop those critical skills for long-term use.

“Copilot for Security really helps our junior analysts, as if they had a coach next to them, guiding them through the learning phase of their role. And for our senior analysts, it’s really helping them push past what would have otherwise been possible, in terms of reaching their potential.”

—Ryan Kivett, Partner Group Manager for Defender Experts, Microsoft

Watch the video “Script Analyzer in Defender.”

Get rich, contextual information with threat intelligence

Understanding an organization’s external threat surface can take a lot of time and tools. Often, analysts must go to multiple repositories to obtain the critical data sets they need to assess a suspicious domain, host, or IP address. DNS data, WHOIS information, malware, and SSL certificates provide important context to indicators of compromise (IOCs), but these repositories are widely distributed and don’t always share a common data structure, making it difficult to ensure analysts have all relevant data needed to make a proper and timely assessment of suspicious infrastructure. Getting threat intelligence data and rich, contextual information from Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence and Copilot helps security analysts make determinations, like whether an IP is malicious or not. In the next video clip, Phoebe Rogers uses Defender Threat Intelligence and Copilot to compare a user’s sign-in properties with their authentication history, surfacing the relevant information to streamline her analysis and determine whether or not it’s a threat.

Watch the video “Getting threat intel data.”

Once a determination is made, it can still take time and effort for an analyst to summarize and communicate a threat to affected parties. But Copilot can help. In our last video clip, Phoebe explains how Copilot can quickly explain the impact of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) and summarize relevant content like impacted products, bad actors known to exploit the vulnerability, and mitigation recommendations.

Watch the video “CVEs and Vulnerabilities.”

Protect at the speed and scale of AI

When faced with incomplete and imperfect data and the need to investigate a potential threat, communicate that threat to a customer, or craft a timely response, security analysts are realizing tangible, measurable benefits from using Copilot in their daily work. It helps them protect and defend their organization at machine speed and scale. Of course, the ability to leverage generative AI is not exclusive to security teams. It may also be leveraged by potential threat actors. So, the sooner security teams can experience and evaluate generative AI to augment and improve their security, the better. That’s why Brian Hooper encourages department leadership who are building their plan to deploy Copilot within their team to encourage exploration. “Let the team try different prompts. Let the team summarize incidents. Let the team analyze scripts. Let the team find out about intelligence that Microsoft knows about attacks. Organically, they will find all different places that it’s going to help them.”

Learn more

To learn more about Microsoft Copilot for Security, visit the product page, and for more helpful tips and information, view the Copilot for Security Playlist on the Microsoft Security Channel on YouTube.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

The post Microsoft Copilot for Security provides immediate impact for the Microsoft Defender Experts team appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Octo Tempest is a financially motivated collective of native English-speaking threat actors known for launching wide-ranging campaigns that prominently feature adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques, social engineering, and SIM swapping capabilities. Octo Tempest, which overlaps with research associated with 0ktapus, Scattered Spider, and UNC3944, was initially seen in early 2022, targeting mobile telecommunications and business process outsourcing organizations to initiate phone number ports (also known as SIM swaps). Octo Tempest monetized their intrusions in 2022 by selling SIM swaps to other criminals and performing account takeovers of high-net-worth individuals to steal their cryptocurrency.

Building on their initial success, Octo Tempest harnessed their experience and acquired data to progressively advance their motives, targeting, and techniques, adopting an increasingly aggressive approach. In late 2022 to early 2023, Octo Tempest expanded their targeting to include cable telecommunications, email, and technology organizations. During this period, Octo Tempest started monetizing intrusions by extorting victim organizations for data stolen during their intrusion operations and in some cases even resorting to physical threats.

In mid-2023, Octo Tempest became an affiliate of ALPHV/BlackCat, a human-operated ransomware as a service (RaaS) operation, and initial victims were extorted for data theft (with no ransomware deployment) using ALPHV Collections leak site. This is notable in that, historically, Eastern European ransomware groups refused to do business with native English-speaking criminals. By June 2023, Octo Tempest started deploying ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware payloads (both Windows and Linux versions) to victims and lately has focused their deployments primarily on VMWare ESXi servers. Octo Tempest progressively broadened the scope of industries targeted for extortion, including natural resources, gaming, hospitality, consumer products, retail, managed service providers, manufacturing, law, technology, and financial services.  

In recent campaigns, we observed Octo Tempest leverage a diverse array of TTPs to navigate complex hybrid environments, exfiltrate sensitive data, and encrypt data. Octo Tempest leverages tradecraft that many organizations don’t have in their typical threat models, such as SMS phishing, SIM swapping, and advanced social engineering techniques. This blog post aims to provide organizations with an insight into Octo Tempest’s tradecraft by detailing the fluidity of their operations and to offer organizations defensive mechanisms to thwart the highly motivated financial cybercriminal group.

Analysis 

The well-organized, prolific nature of Octo Tempest’s attacks is indicative of extensive technical depth and multiple hands-on-keyboard operators. The succeeding sections cover the wide range of TTPs we observed being used by Octo Tempest.

Initial access 

Social engineering with a twist

Octo Tempest commonly launches social engineering attacks targeting technical administrators, such as support and help desk personnel, who have permissions that could enable the threat actor to gain initial access to accounts. The threat actor performs research on the organization and identifies targets to effectively impersonate victims, mimicking idiolect on phone calls and understanding personal identifiable information to trick technical administrators into performing password resets and resetting multifactor authentication (MFA) methods. Octo Tempest has also been observed impersonating newly hired employees in these attempts to blend into normal on-hire processes.

Octo Tempest primarily gains initial access to an organization using one of several methods:

• Social engineering
  • Calling an employee and socially engineering the user to either:
    • Install a Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) utility
    • Navigate to a site configured with a fake login portal using an adversary-in-the-middle toolkit
    • Remove their FIDO2 token
  • Calling an organization’s help desk and socially engineering the help desk to reset the user’s password and/or change/add a multi-factor authentication token/factor
• Purchasing an employee’s credentials and/or session token(s) on a criminal underground market
• SMS phishing employee phone numbers with a link to a site configured with a fake login portal using an adversary-in-the-middle toolkit
• Using the employee’s pre-existing access to mobile telecommunications and business process outsourcing organizations to initiate a SIM swap or to set up call number forwarding on an employee’s phone number. Octo Tempest will initiate a self-service password reset of the user’s account once they have gained control of the employee’s phone number.

In rare instances, Octo Tempest resorts to fear-mongering tactics, targeting specific individuals through phone calls and texts. These actors use personal information, such as home addresses and family names, along with physical threats to coerce victims into sharing credentials for corporate access.

Reconnaissance and discovery 

Crossing borders for identity, architecture, and controls enumeration

In the early stage of their attacks, Octo Tempest performs various enumeration and information gathering actions to pursue advanced access in targeted environments and abuses legitimate channels for follow-on actions later in the attack sequence. Initial bulk-export of users, groups, and device information is closely followed by enumerating data and resources readily available to the user’s profile within virtual desktop infrastructure or enterprise-hosted resources. 

Frequently, Octo Tempest uses their access to carry out broad searches across knowledge repositories to identify documents related to network architecture, employee onboarding, remote access methods, password policies, and credential vaults.

Octo Tempest then performs exploration through multi-cloud environments enumerating access and resources across cloud environments, code repositories, server and backup management infrastructure, and others. In this stage, the threat actor validates access, enumerates databases and storage containers, and plans footholds to aid further phases of the attack.

Additional tradecraft and techniques:

• PingCastle and ADRecon to perform reconnaissance of Active Directory 
• Advanced IP Scanner to probe victim networks
• Govmomi Go library to enumerate vCenter APIs 
• PureStorage FlashArray PowerShell module to enumerate storage arrays 
• AAD bulk downloads of user, groups, and devices

Privilege escalation and credential access

Octo Tempest commonly elevates their privileges within an organization through the following techniques:

• Using their pre-existing access to mobile telecommunications and business process outsourcing organizations to initiate a SIM swap or to set up call number forwarding on an employee’s phone number. Octo Tempest will initiate a self-service password reset of the user’s account once they have gained control of the employee’s phone number.
• Social engineering – calling an organization’s help desk and socially engineering the help desk to reset an administrator’s password and/or change/add a multi-factor authentication token/factor

Further masquerading and collection for escalation

Octo Tempest employs an advanced social engineering strategy for privilege escalation, harnessing stolen password policy procedures, bulk downloads of user, group, and role exports, and their familiarity with the target organizations procedures. The actor’s privilege escalation tactics often rely on building trust through various means, such as leveraging possession of compromised accounts and demonstrating an understanding of the organization’s procedures. In some cases, they go as far as bypassing password reset procedures by using a compromised manager’s account to approve their requests.

Octo Tempest continually seeks to collect additional credentials across all planes of access. Using open-source tooling like Jercretz and TruffleHog, the threat actor automates the identification of plaintext keys, secrets, and credentials across code repositories for further use.

Additional tradecraft and techniques:

• Modifying access policies or using MicroBurst to gain access to credential stores
• Using open-source tooling: Mimikatz, Hekatomb, Lazagne, gosecretsdump, smbpasswd.py, LinPEAS, ADFSDump
• Using VMAccess Extension to reset passwords or modify configurations of Azure VMs
• Creating snapshots virtual domain controller disks to download and extract NTDS.dit
• Assignment of User Access Administrator role to grant Tenant Root Group management scope

Defense evasion

Security product arsenal sabotage

Octo Tempest compromises security personnel accounts within victim organizations to turn off security products and features and attempt to evade detection throughout their compromise. Using compromised accounts, the threat actor leverages EDR and device management technologies to allow malicious tooling, deploy RMM software, remove or impair security products, data theft of sensitive files (e.g. files with credentials, signal messaging databases, etc.), and deploy malicious payloads.

To prevent identification of security product manipulation and suppress alerts or notifications of changes, Octo Tempest modifies the security staff mailbox rules to automatically delete emails from vendors that may raise the target’s suspicion of their activities.

Additional tradecraft and techniques:

• Using open-source tooling like privacy.sexy framework to disable security products
• Enrolling actor-controlled devices into device management software to bypass controls
• Configuring trusted locations in Conditional Access Policies to expand access capabilities
• Replaying harvested tokens with satisfied MFA claims to bypass MFA

Persistence 

Sustained intrusion with identities and open-source tools

Octo Tempest leverages publicly available security tools to establish persistence within victim organizations, largely using account manipulation techniques and implants on hosts. For identity-based persistence, Octo Tempest targets federated identity providers using tools like AADInternals to federate existing domains, or spoof legitimate domains by adding and then federating new domains. The threat actor then abuses this federation to generate forged valid security assertion markup language (SAML) tokens for any user of the target tenant with claims that have MFA satisfied, a technique known as Golden SAML. Similar techniques have also been observed using Okta as their source of truth identity provider, leveraging Okta Org2Org functionality to impersonate any desired user account.

To maintain access to endpoints, Octo Tempest installs a wide array of legitimate RMM tools and makes required network modifications to enable access. The usage of reverse shells is seen across Octo Tempest intrusions on both Windows and Linux endpoints. These reverse shells commonly initiate connections to the same attacker infrastructure that deployed the RMM tools.

A unique technique Octo Tempest uses is compromising VMware ESXi infrastructure, installing the open-source Linux backdoor Bedevil, and then launching VMware Python scripts to run arbitrary commands against housed virtual machines.

Additional tradecraft and techniques:

• Usage of open-source tooling: ScreenConnect, FleetDeck, AnyDesk, RustDesk, Splashtop, Pulseway, TightVNC, LummaC2, Level.io, Mesh, TacticalRMM, Tailscale, Ngrok, WsTunnel, Rsocx, and Socat
• Deployment of Azure virtual machines to enable remote access via RMM installation or modification to existing resources via Azure serial console
• Addition of MFA methods to existing users
• Usage of the third-party tunneling tool Twingate, which leverages Azure Container instances as a private connector (without public network exposure)

Actions on objectives

Common trifecta: Data theft, extortion, and ransomware

The goal of Octo Tempest remains financially motivated, but the monetization techniques observed across industries vary between cryptocurrency theft and data exfiltration for extortion and ransomware deployment.

Like in most cyberattacks, data theft largely depends on the data readily available to the threat actor. Octo Tempest accesses data from code repositories, large document management and storage systems, including SharePoint, SQL databases, cloud storage blobs/buckets, and email, using legitimate management clients such as DBeaver, MongoDB Compass, Azure SQL Query Editor, and Cerebrata for the purpose of connection and collection. After data harvesting, the threat actor employs anonymous file-hosting services, including GoFile.io, shz.al, StorjShare, Temp.sh, MegaSync, Paste.ee, Backblaze, and AWS S3 buckets for data exfiltration.

Octo Tempest employs a unique technique using the data movement platform Azure Data Factory and automated pipelines to extract data to external actor hosted Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) servers, aiming to blend in with typical big data operations. Additionally, the threat actor commonly registers legitimate Microsoft 365 backup solutions such as Veeam, AFI Backup, and CommVault to export the contents of SharePoint document libraries and expedite data exfiltration.

Ransomware deployment closely follows data theft objectives. This activity targets both Windows and Unix/Linux endpoints and VMware hypervisors using a variant of ALPHV/BlackCat. Encryption at the hypervisor level has shown significant impact to organizations, making recovery efforts difficult post-encryption.

Octo Tempest frequently communicates with target organizations and their personnel directly after encryption to negotiate or extort the ransom—providing “proof of life” through samples of exfiltrated data. Many of these communications have been leaked publicly, causing significant reputational damage to affected organizations.

Additional tradecraft and techniques:

• Use of the third-party services like FiveTran to extract copies of high-value service databases, such as SalesForce and ZenDesk, using API connectors
• Exfiltration of mailbox PST files and mail forwarding to external mailboxes

Recommendations

Hunting methodology

Octo Tempest’s utilization of social engineering, living-off-the land techniques, and diverse toolsets could make hunting slightly unorthodox. Following these general guidelines alongside robust deconfliction with legitimate users will surface their activity:

Identity

• Understand authentication flows in the environment.
• Centralize visibility of administrative changes in the environment into a single pane of glass.
• Scrutinize all user and sign-in risk detections for any administrator within the timeframe. Common alerts that are surfaced during an Octo Tempest intrusion include (but not limited to): Impossible Travel, Unfamiliar Sign-in Properties, and Anomalous Token
• Review the coverage of Conditional Access policies; scrutinize the use of trusted locations and exclusions.
• Review all existing and new custom domains in the tenant, and their federation settings.
• Scrutinize administrator groups, roles, and privileges for recent modification.
• Review recently created Microsoft Entra ID users and registered device identities.
• Look for any anomalous pivots into organizational apps that may hold sensitive data, such as Microsoft SharePoint and OneDrive.

Azure

• Leverage and continuously monitor Defender for Cloud for Azure Workloads, providing a wealth of information around unauthorized resource access.
• Review Azure role-based access control (RBAC) definitions across the management group, subscription, resource group and resource structure.
• Review the public network exposure of resources and revoke any unauthorized modifications.
• Review both data plane and management plane access control for all critical workloads such as those that hold credentials and organizational data, like Key Vaults, storage accounts, and database resources.
• Tightly control access to identity workloads that issue access organizational resources such as Active Directory Domain Controllers.
• Review the Azure Activity log for anomalous modification of resources.

Endpoints

• Look for recent additions to the indicators or exclusions of the EDR solution in place at the organization.
• Review any generation of offboarding scripts.
• Review access control within security products and EDR software suites.
• Scrutinize any tools used to manage endpoints (SCCM, Intune, etc.) and look for recent rule additions, packages, or deployments.
• Scrutinize use of remote administration tools across the environment, paying particular attention to recent installations regardless of whether they are used legitimately within the network already.
• Ensure monitoring at the network boundary is in place, that alerting is in place for connections with common anonymizing services and scrutinize the use of these services.

Defending against Octo Tempest activity

Align privilege in Microsoft Entra ID and Azure

Privileges spanning Microsoft Entra ID and Azure need to be holistically aligned, with purposeful design decisions to prevent unauthorized access to critical workloads. Reducing the number of users with permanently assigned critical roles is paramount to achieving this. Segregation of privilege between on-premises and cloud is also necessary to sever the ability to pivot within the environment.

It is highly recommended to implement Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) as a central location for the management of both Microsoft Entra ID roles and Azure RBAC. For all critical roles, at minimum:

• Implement role assignments as eligible rather than permanent.
• Review and understand the role definition Actions and NotActions – ensure to select only the roles with actions that the user requires to do their role (least privileged access).
• Configure these roles to be time-bound, deactivating after a specific timeframe.
• Require users to perform MFA to elevate to the role.
• Optionally require users to provide justification or a ticket number upon elevation.
• Enable notifications for privileged role elevation to a subset of administrators.
• Utilize PIM Access Reviews to reduce standing access in the organization on a periodic basis.

Every organization is different and, therefore, roles will be classified differently in terms of their criticality. Consider the scope of impact those roles may have on downstream resources, services, or identities in the event of compromise. For help desk administrators specifically, ensure to scope privilege to exclude administrative operations over Global Administrators. Consider implementing segregation strategies such as Microsoft Entra ID Administrative Units to segment administrative access over the tenant. For identities that leverage cross-service roles such as those that service the Microsoft Security Stack, consider implementing additional service-based granular access control to restrict the use of sensitive functionality, like Live Response and modification of IOC allow lists.

Segment Azure landing zones

For organizations yet to begin or are early in their modernization journey, end-to-end guidance for cloud adoption is available through the Microsoft Azure Cloud Adoption Framework. Recommended practice and security are central pillars—Azure workloads are segregated into separate, tightly restricted areas known as landing zones. When deploying Active Directory in the cloud, it is advised to create a platform landing zone for identity—a dedicated subscription to hold all Identity-related resources such as Domain Controller VM resources. Employ least privilege across this landing zone with the aforementioned privilege and PIM guidance for Azure RBAC.

Implement Conditional Access policies and authentication methods

TTPs outlined in this blog leverage strategies to evade multifactor authentication defenses. However, it is still strongly recommended to practice basic security hygiene by implementing a baseline set of Conditional Access policies:

• Require multifactor authentication for all privileged roles with the use of authentication strengths to enforce phish-resistant MFA methods such as FIDO2 security keys
• Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for administrators
• Enforce MFA registration from trusted locations from a device that also meets organizational requirements with Intune device compliance policies
• User and sign-in risk policies for signals associated to Microsoft Entra ID Protection

Organizations are recommended to keep their policies as simple as possible. Implementing complex policies might inhibit the ability to respond to threats at a rapid pace or allow threat actors to leverage misconfigurations within the environment.

Develop and maintain a user education strategy

An organization’s ability to protect itself against cyberattacks is only as strong as its people—it is imperative to put in place an end-to-end cybersecurity strategy highlighting the importance of ongoing user education and awareness. Targeted education and periodic security awareness campaigns around common cyber threats and attack vectors such as phishing and social engineering not only for users that hold administrative privilege in the organization, but the wider user base is crucial. A well-maintained incident response plan should be developed and refined to enable organizations to respond to unexpected cybersecurity events and rapidly regain positive control.

Use out-of-band communication channels

Octo Tempest has been observed joining, recording, and transcribing calls using tools such as OtterAI, and sending messages via Slack, Zoom, and Microsoft Teams, taunting and threatening targets, organizations, defenders, and gaining insights into incident response operations/planning. Using out-of-band communication channels is strongly encouraged when dealing with this threat actor.

Detections

Microsoft 365 Defender

Microsoft 365 Defender is becoming Microsoft Defender XDR. Learn more.

NOTE: Several tools mentioned throughout this blog are remote administrator tools that have been utilized by Octo Tempest to maintain persistence. While these tools are abused by threat actors, they can have legitimate use cases by normal users, and are updated on a frequent basis. Microsoft recommends monitoring their use within the environment, and when they are identified, defenders take the necessary steps for deconfliction to verify their use.

Microsoft Defender Antivirus

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects this threat as the following malware:

• HackTool:Win32/Mimikatz
• HackTool:Win64/Mimikatz
• Behavior:Win32/BlackCatExec
• Ransom:Win32/Blackcat
• Ransom:Linux/BlackCat
• Behavior:Win32/BlackCat
• Ransom:Win64/BlackCat

Turning on tamper protection, which is part of built-in protection, prevents attackers from stopping security services.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

The following Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts can indicate associated threat activity:

• Octo Tempest activity group

The following alerts might also indicate threat activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can also be triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• Suspicious usage of remote management software
• Mimikatz credential theft tool
• BlackCat ransomware
• Activity linked to BlackCat ransomware
• Tampering activity typical to ransomware attacks
• Possible hands-on-keyboard pre-ransom activity

Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps

Using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps connectors, Microsoft 365 Defender raises AitM-related alerts in multiple scenarios. For Microsoft Entra ID customers using Microsoft Edge, attempts by attackers to replay session cookies to access cloud applications are detected by Microsoft 365 Defender through Defender for Cloud Apps connectors for Microsoft Office 365 and Azure. In such scenarios, Microsoft 365 Defender raises the following alerts:

• Backdoor creation using AADInternals tool
• Suspicious domain added to Microsoft Entra ID
• Suspicious domain trust modification following risky sign-in
• User compromised via a known AitM phishing kit
• User compromised in AiTM phishing attack
• Suspicious email deletion activity

Similarly, the connector for Okta raises the following alerts:

• Suspicious Okta account enumeration
• Possible AiTM phishing attempt in Okta

Microsoft Defender for Identity

Microsoft Defender for Identity raises the following alerts for TTPs used by Octo Tempest such as NTDS stealing and Active Directory reconnaissance:

• Account enumeration reconnaissance
• Network-mapping reconnaissance (DNS)
• User and IP address reconnaissance (SMB)
• User and Group membership reconnaissance (SAMR)
• Suspected DCSync attack (replication of directory services)
• Suspected AD FS DKM key read
• Data exfiltration over SMB

Microsoft Defender for Cloud

The following Microsoft Defender for Cloud alerts relate to TTPs used by Octo Tempest. Note, however, that these alerts can also be triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• MicroBurst exploitation toolkit used to enumerate resources in your subscriptions
• MicroBurst exploitation toolkit used to execute code on your virtual machine
• MicroBurst exploitation toolkit used to extract keys from your Azure key vaults
• MicroBurst exploitation toolkit used to extract keys to your storage accounts
• Suspicious Azure role assignment detected
• Suspicious elevate access operation (Preview)
• Suspicious invocation of a high-risk ‘Initial Access’ operation detected (Preview)
• Suspicious invocation of a high-risk ‘Credential Access’ operation detected (Preview)
• Suspicious invocation of a high-risk ‘Data Collection’ operation detected (Preview)
• Suspicious invocation of a high-risk ‘Execution’ operation detected (Preview)
• Suspicious invocation of a high-risk ‘Impact’ operation detected (Preview)
• Suspicious invocation of a high-risk ‘Lateral Movement’ operation detected (Preview)
• Unusual user password reset in your virtual machine
• Suspicious usage of VMAccess extension was detected on your virtual machines (Preview)
• Suspicious usage of multiple monitoring or data collection extensions was detected on your virtual machines (Preview)
• Run Command with a suspicious script was detected on your virtual machine (Preview)
• Suspicious Run Command usage was detected on your virtual machine (Preview)
• Suspicious unauthorized Run Command usage was detected on your virtual machine (Preview)

Microsoft Sentinel

Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the following Microsoft Sentinel Analytics template to identify potential AitM phishing attempts:

• Possible AitM Phishing Attempt Against Azure AD

This detection uses signals from Microsoft Entra ID Identity Protection and looks for successful sign-ins that have been flagged as high risk. It combines this with data from web proxy services, such as ZScaler, to identify where users might have connected to the source of those sign-ins immediately prior. This can indicate a user interacting with an AitM phishing site and having their session hijacked. This detection uses the Advanced Security Information Model (ASIM) Web Session schema. Refer to this article for more details on the schema and its requirements. 

Threat intelligence reports

Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide the intelligence, protection info, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.

Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence

• Octo Tempest
• Octo Tempest uses social engineering and AADInternals to compromise cloud identities

Microsoft 365 Defender Threat analytics  

• Actor profile: Octo Tempest
• Threat insights: Octo Tempest uses social engineering and AADInternals to compromise cloud identities

Hunting queries

Microsoft Sentinel

Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace.

Microsoft Sentinel also has a range of detection and threat hunting content that customers can use to detect the post exploitation activity detailed in this blog in addition to Microsoft 365 Defender detections list above.

• Suspicious sign-in followed by MFA modification
• Account MFA modifications
• Okta SSO phishing detection
• Okta rare MFA operations
• Okta login from different locations
• Okta user password reset
• SharePointFileOperation via clientIP with previously unseen user agents
• SharePointFileOperation via devices with previously unseen user agents
• SharePointFileOperation via previously unseen IPs of risky ASN’s
• SharePointFileOperation via previously unseen IPs
• Anomalous AAD account manipulation
• New external user granted admin
• Anomolous sign-ins based on time
• New account added to admin group
• Authentication methods changed for privileged account
• Rare run command PowerShell script
• Azure NSG administrative operations
• Rare operations of create and update of snapshots
• AdFind usage
• Anomalous listing of storage keys
• Storage account key enumeration
• Potential Microsoft Security services tampering
• Potential Microsoft Defender tampering
• Office mail forwarding
• Multiple users Office mail forwarding

Further reading

Listen to Microsoft experts discuss Octo Tempest TTPs and activities on The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast.

Visit this page for more blogs from Microsoft Incident Response.

For more security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: https://aka.ms/threatintelblog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on X (formerly Twitter) at https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel.

November 1, 2023 update: Updated the Actions of objectives section to fix the list of anonymous file-hosting services used by Octo Tempest for data exfiltration, which incorrectly listed Sh.Azl. It has been corrected to shz.al.

The post Octo Tempest crosses boundaries to facilitate extortion, encryption, and destruction appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

At Microsoft, we aim to help our customers meet the range of today’s security demands—together. In this environment, it is not a surprise that organizations are looking to do more with less and turning to managed security services to help their security teams.

Microsoft Security Experts

Extend your ability to defend and manage with a comprehensive line of services from the experts at Microsoft.

Learn more

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

In preview last year, Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR is now generally available. This managed extended detection and response (MXDR) service helps customers alleviate some of their most pressing pain points, including alert fatigue, scarce cybersecurity resources, and a limited ability to look end-to-end—beyond the endpoints—to visualize and correlate threat data across their entire digital environment. For most companies, security isn’t their core business. Defender Experts for XDR can help customers drive security operations center (SOC) efficiency and add security expertise to their team quickly, freeing up their time to work on other security priorities.

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR helps SOC teams focus on what matters, triaging and investigating prioritized incidents on your behalf. Our Defender Experts are available around the clock to chat about specific incidents or alerts, so your team can get immediate confirmation or clarification on a particular incident. Also, they provide detailed best practices and recommendations to help your team prevent future attacks and improve your overall security posture.

To learn more about Defender Experts for XDR, read through our blog that walks through how the service works or watch our explainer video to see the service in action.

Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting

Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting is generally available for customers who look to Microsoft to proactively hunt for threats across Microsoft Defender data—including endpoints, email, cloud applications, and identity. Defender Experts for Hunting combines human expertise and hunter-trained AI to probe deeper to expose threats and correlate across your security stack. Improve your SOC response and prioritize significant threats with timely notifications and analysis by our expert threat hunters. And if you have questions, you can contact our Experts on Demand directly within your Microsoft Defender portal.

To learn more about how we approach active threat hunting, read through our Threat Hunting Survival Guide, or read about our participation in MITRE’s first managed services evaluation.

Microsoft Incident Response

For customers that want help remediating a complex breach (or avoiding one altogether), Microsoft Incident Response (Microsoft IR) offers an end-to-end portfolio of proactive and reactive incident response services. We’ve been helping customers with their toughest incident response challenges since 2008. And we created Microsoft IR to be the first call for customers before, during, and after an incident. We operate in 190 countries and our incident responders are seasoned veterans with more than a combined 1,000 years of career experience resolving attacks from ransomware criminals to the most sophisticated nation-state threat actor groups.

Proactive services can help organizations identify and mitigate risks before they become incidents. This includes services such as compromise assessments, threat hunting, and incident response planning. We know companies that put proactive measures in place detect breaches 108 days faster than those without support (214 days compared to 322 days).³ Reactive services can help organizations respond to a breach quickly and effectively to mitigate damage. This includes services such as incident investigation, containment, and remediation.

Since our last update, Microsoft Incident Response Retainer is now generally available. This new option is designed to give our customers a proactive way to get IR support from Microsoft and was designed to work with cyber insurance. The Microsoft IR Retainer is a flexible and scalable service that can help organizations of all sizes prepare for and respond to cyber incidents. The retainer includes pre-paid hours that provide organizations with peace of mind knowing that they have the resources they need to respond to an incident, regardless of its size or complexity. And if reactive services are not needed, the pre-paid hours can be reallocated to proactive services that help shore up the organization’s security posture. The Microsoft Incident Response Retainer is a valuable tool for organizations of all sizes that want to be prepared for the unexpected. View the explainer video for more information.

To learn more about all our Incident Response services—including the newly available retainer—visit our Microsoft Incident Response webpage or go behind the scenes for an inside look at real-life cyberattack investigations in the Cyberattack Series.

Expert-led security transformation

Microsoft Security Enterprise Services (Enterprise Services), formerly known as Microsoft Security Services for Modernization, has restructured its offerings and is now more focused on helping customers meet modern security needs. These services are ideal for large enterprises that want to leverage Microsoft best practices and know-how as they continue their security transformation. Enterprise Services offers hands-on expertise and advisory services to assess and create your modern organizational cybersecurity strategy. These offerings provide planning and operations expertise to help you mitigate business risks and meet compliance requirements to ensure your business is future-ready. The services have recently been combined into two core expertise areas:

Security Cyber Resilience: End-to-end services to modernize and secure your digital estate including identities, data, applications, and devices across Microsoft Azure and multicloud environments. Microsoft Security Cyber Resilience helps safeguard your digital estate and create a transformation program of change, strategy, and operating models.

Security Operations: Secure your digital estate and safeguard critical information and assets with a security strategy and framework designed and implemented to respond to the modern threat landscape. Security Operations helps create—and action—a program of change for cybersecurity to make your digital estate more secure.

Working alongside our partners

Cybersecurity is a team sport. Too often, organizations play it outnumbered and outsmarted by the attacker. For most companies, cybersecurity is not their core business, and hiring specialized resources to address these concerns can be a challenge. Most customers rely on a trusted security provider in some capacity to help them on their security journey.

Microsoft partners provide robust services and the ability to uniquely customize their offering to your needs. Service providers commonly protect across the breadth of your estate including Microsoft and other third-party security tools. Microsoft’s partners also routinely provide customized service level agreements, data regulatory and industry specialization, and other specialized services aligned with the specific needs you may have, ranging from remotely managed supplementary services to your in-house team through full outsourcing services as required. Microsoft Security Experts services were built to work alongside partner services, and we frequently partner with them on customer requests and design feedback for our solutions.

Over the previous 12 months, more than 40 partners in the Microsoft Cloud Partner Program with Security designations have now received this verified MXDR engineering verification. If you are considering adding MXDR services, we recommend reviewing one of Microsoft’s verified MXDR service partners.

Looking to the future

As we continue to face new cybersecurity challenges, Microsoft will continue to evolve our Microsoft Security Experts services through our innovative engineering practices while leveraging the immense power of AI and other breakthrough technologies to help protect individuals, businesses, and more. Visit the Microsoft Security Experts page to learn more.

Cybersecurity and AI news

Discover the latest trends and best practices in cyberthreat protection and AI for cybersecurity.

Get the latest resources

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and Twitter (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.  

¹Revealing New Opportunities for the Cybersecurity Workforce, (ISC)2. 2022.

²Top Risks in Cybersecurity 2023, Bipartisan Policy Center. February 13, 2023.

³Cost of a Data Breach Report 2023, IBM. 2023.

The post Expanded Microsoft Security Experts offerings provide comprehensive protection appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Cybersecurity threats to large events and venues are diverse and complex. They require constant vigilance and collaboration among stakeholders to prevent and mitigate escalation. With the global sports market valued at more than USD600 billion, sports teams, major league and global sporting associations, and attendees house a trove of valuable information desirable to cyber criminals.¹

Unfortunately, this information is made increasingly vulnerable by the growing number of connected venues, and with the number of devices and interconnected networks in these environments, sports teams as well as major league and global sporting associations and attendees house a trove of valuable information desirable to cybercriminals.

Venue IT systems and arenas contain hundreds of known and unknown vulnerabilities that allow threat actors to target critical business services such as point of sale, IT infrastructures, and visitor devices. Teams, coaches, and athletes themselves are also vulnerable to data loss on athletic performance, competitive advantage, and personal information. Attendee personal identifiable information can also be targeted through vulnerable event digital amenities, like companion mobile apps, wireless hotspots, and QR codes with malicious URLs.

Cyber Signals

The fifth edition of Cyber Signals looks at threats to large venues, and sporting and entertainment events.

Read the report

Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting developed comprehensive cybersecurity defenses for Qatari facilities and organizations supporting the soccer tournament. Defender Experts for Hunting conducted an initial risk assessment, factoring in threat actor profiles, adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures, and other global intelligence from our telemetry. We ultimately analyzed more than 634.4 million events while providing cybersecurity defenses for Qatari facilities and organizations throughout November and December of 2022.    

With sporting and entertainment events at large, there is a level of cyber risk and vulnerability that does not exist in other environments. Because some of these events come together quickly, often with new partners and vendors acquiring access to enterprise networks that are perceived as temporary, they are often not designed for evaluation and ongoing refinement of the security posture.

In addition to the pre-planning required to support this unique security apparatus, venues consider the privacy risk associated with temporary, ad-hoc, and permanent cyber infrastructure. That means understanding and acknowledging if configurations needed to support the event potentially add additional risk or vulnerability.

To safeguard against cybersecurity threats, sports, associations, teams, and venues must adopt robust protective measures. First and foremost, they should prioritize the implementation of a comprehensive and multilayered security framework. This includes deploying firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and strong encryption protocols to fortify the network against unauthorized access and data breaches. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify and address any weaknesses within the network infrastructure.

Furthermore, user awareness and training programs are crucial to educating employees and stakeholders about cybersecurity best practices, such as recognizing phishing emails, using multifactor authentication or passwordless protection, and avoiding suspicious links or downloads. Additionally, it is essential to partner with reputable cybersecurity firms to continuously monitor network traffic, detect potential threats in real time, and respond swiftly to any security incidents. By adopting these proactive measures, sports associations, teams, and venues can significantly enhance their resilience against cyberattacks and protect both their own infrastructure and the sensitive information of their patrons.

Learn more in this fifth edition of Cyber Signals.

Learn more

Learn more about Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and Twitter (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

¹Global Sports Market Forecast to 2032: Sector is Expected to Reach $623.63 Billion in 2027 at a CAGR of 5%, Globe Newswire. May 3, 2023.

The post Cyber Signals: Sporting events and venues draw cyberthreats at increasing rates appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

Meet the new first-party MXDR services from Microsoft with end-to-end protection and expertise.

Learn more

Defender Experts for XDR builds on Microsoft’s industry-leading XDR suite

Industry-leading technologies serve as the backbone of any managed security service, and Defender Experts for XDR builds on the defining benchmark that Microsoft 365 Defender has set in the extended detection and response space. Microsoft was named a Leader in The Forrester New Wave™: Extended Detection and Response (XDR), Q4, 2021, one of only two providers to be named a Leader.⁵ Microsoft 365 Defender was rated as “differentiated” in seven criteria including detection, investigation, response, and remediation. Forrester noted that our decision to regulate inputs into XDR, specifically to rich, native telemetry, yields tailored detection, investigation, response, and mitigation capabilities.

Forrester notes that “there is a deep divide in the XDR market between those far along the path and those just starting to deliver on the vision of XDR” and those mature providers “combine the best elements of their portfolios, including industry-leading products, to simplify incident response and build targeted, high-efficacy detections.”

The right and leading technologies are crucial to implementing managed services. Microsoft has a leading endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution, and while EDR is important and serves a valuable purpose, it is insufficient as the only method to protect against evolving threats.⁶ In addition, “too many tools, or worse, duplicate tools in the SOC [security operations center] need to be rationalized and managed security services like MDR [managed detection and response] are increasingly seen as not only a cost savings opportunity but also as a way to rapidly mature their capabilities.”⁷ With Microsoft’s XDR solution coupled with Defender Experts for XDR, we can deliver end-to-end protection and expertise.

How Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR works

Our Defender Experts team delivers the essential human element that complements the power of our Microsoft 365 Defender suite. They are the tip of the spear—taking unparalleled access to data and intelligence across nation-state and e-crime activity, new vulnerability data, newly observed tactics and techniques, and more to analyze and curate a hypothesis-led hunting strategy to find emerging, suspicious activities, and in turn deliver expertise to your security team immediately to help address coverage gaps and augment your overall security operations.

Figure 1. This diagram describes how Microsoft conducts its four-step Defender Experts for XDR process. It starts with triage and prioritizing Microsoft 365 Defender incidents and alerts to alleviate alert fatigue. Microsoft investigates and analyzes the most critical incidents first, documenting the process and findings. In the response step, Microsoft helps contain and mitigate incidents faster by delivering step-by-step guided and managed response, with Defender Experts available on-demand by live chat. Detailed recommendations and best practices are then provided to prevent future attacks. This process delivers continuous security posture improvements around the clock.

As an extension of your team, Defender Experts for XDR empowers you to respond with confidence. Our Defender Experts work around the clock, monitoring your environment and triaging the incidents that need immediate attention. In the event your organization is being affected by a critical incident, our team will investigate it, correlate the threat data to determine the root cause, and provide step-by-step response actions you need to take to contain and remediate the threat. You can take it further and give us permission to contain and remediate the threat for you.

Figure 2. This graphic shows a multistage incident in Microsoft 365 Defender. It includes the attack story of the active alerts related to the incident as well as the Defender Experts section that shows the guided response that includes the actions needed to resolve the incident immediately.

This is all available to you in a turnkey experience, where you can get up and running in hours, with the help of your dedicated service delivery manager (SDM)—your trusted advisor, who is available to you at any given time. And if you have any questions or need additional context on a particular incident, you can access our experts around the clock through live chat. Our detailed, real-time reporting shows you the comprehensive details of investigations into critical incidents, and how long it takes for our team to conduct the investigations on your behalf.

Figure 3. The graph highlights the number of hours that a customer spent completing guided response tasks and the potential time savings a customer can realize if Defender Experts for XDR handles response on their behalf.

“Defender Experts for XDR found a shadow IT detection on the first day of service,” said Mike Johnson, Global Cyber Threat and Incident Response Security Operations Center Manager at Verifone. “I was impressed that they found a real issue for us so fast—none of our other tools alerted us about it.”

Defender Experts for XDR also provides recommendations on how your team can be proactive to prevent the next attack and reduce the number of incidents over time to improve your security posture. “Organizations who need to augment their SOC with 24/7 coverage and immediate access to expertise that will help them quickly triage, investigate, and respond to incidents should explore a managed XDR service,“ said Craig Robinson, Vice President of Security Services at IDC Research. “Microsoft’s new MXDR service positions them to support the needs of organizations facing talent shortages who need to scale their security programs quickly, address coverage gaps, and protect their environment.”

Learn more about Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR

Defender Experts for XDR can quickly deliver expertise to your security teams, help address coverage gaps, and add capabilities like proactive threat hunting to augment your overall security operations. Our customers and partners have been instrumental in the development of Defender Experts for XDR and your continued trust in us drives our team to listen, learn, and adapt to meet your evolving needs. We’re excited about the road ahead and look forward to being a part of your security journey and building a safer world for everyone.

To learn more about the service, visit the Microsoft Defender Experts for XDR web page, read the Defender Experts for XDR docs page, download the datasheet, or watch a short video.

Cybersecurity and AI news

Discover the latest trends and best practices in cyberthreat protection and AI for cybersecurity.

Get the latest resources

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and Twitter (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

¹Building a safer world together with our partners—introducing Microsoft Security Experts, Vasu Jakkal. May 9, 2022.

²Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting proactively hunts threats, Microsoft Security Experts. August 3, 2022.

³Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting demonstrates industry-leading protection in the 2022 MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK® Evaluations for Managed Services, Ryan Kivett. November 9, 2022.

⁴Meet unprecedented security challenges by leveraging MXDR services, Microsoft Security Experts. July 10, 2023.

⁵Forrester Research, Inc., The Forrester New Wave™: Extended Detection And Response (XDR) Providers, Q4 2021, Allie Mellen, Joseph Blankenship, Alexis Tatro, Peggy Dostie. October 13, 2021.

⁶Microsoft is named a Leader in the 2022 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Endpoint Protection Platforms, Rob Lefferts. March 2, 2023.

⁷Applying the Lessons Learned from 2022 Is Vital for Security Service Providers to Secure Growth in 2023, Doc #US50206623, IDC. February 2023.

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