{"id":1888,"date":"2008-03-14T19:11:12","date_gmt":"2008-03-15T02:11:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/marcbook.local\/wds\/playground\/cybertrust\/2008\/03\/14\/training-people-on-threat-modeling\/"},"modified":"2023-08-10T14:27:53","modified_gmt":"2023-08-10T21:27:53","slug":"training-people-on-threat-modeling","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/security\/blog\/2008\/03\/14\/training-people-on-threat-modeling\/","title":{"rendered":"Training People on Threat Modeling"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
Threat<\/td>\n | Property<\/td>\n | Definition<\/td>\n | Example<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||||||||
Spoofing<\/b><\/td>\n | Authentication<\/td>\n | Impersonating something or someone else.<\/td>\n | Pretending to be any of billg, microsoft.com or ntdll.dll<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||||||||
T<\/b>ampering<\/td>\n | Integrity<\/td>\n | Modifying data or code<\/td>\n | Modifying a DLL on disk or DVD, or a packet as it traverses the LAN.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||||||||
R<\/b>epudiation<\/td>\n | Non-repudiation<\/td>\n | Claiming to have not performed an action.<\/td>\n | “I didn’t send that email,” “I didn’t modify that file,” “I certainly<\/i> didn’t visit that web site, dear!”<\/td>\n<\/tr>\nI<\/b>nformation Disclosure<\/td>\n | Confidentiality<\/td>\n | Exposing information to someone not authorized to see it<\/td>\n | Allowing someone to read the Windows source code; publishing a list of customers to a web site.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | D<\/b>enial of Service<\/td>\n | Availability<\/td>\n | Deny or degrade service to users<\/td>\n | Crashing Windows or a web site, sending a packet and absorbing seconds of CPU time, or routing packets into a black hole.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | E<\/b>levation of Privilege<\/td>\n | Authorization<\/td>\n | Gain capabilities without proper authorization<\/td>\n | Allowing a remote internet user to run commands is the classic example, but going from a limited user to admin is also EoP.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n | <\/p>\n (Ian’s post is here https:\/\/financialcryptography.com\/mt\/archives\/001013.html<\/a> . IE users will see a warning about certificate authorities when visiting this site. As I wrote this, Gunnar Peterson added commentary at “Threats, Mechanisms and Standards<\/a>.”)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Adam Shostack here. Blogger Ian Grigg has an interesting response to my threat modeling blog series, and I wanted to respond to it. In particular, Ian says “I then would prefer to see the threat – property matrix this way:” I wanted to share an additional table from our training, and talk about repudiation […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":61,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"_classifai_error":"","footnotes":""},"content-type":[3659],"topic":[],"products":[],"threat-intelligence":[],"tags":[3825,3822],"coauthors":[1973],"class_list":["post-1888","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","content-type-best-practices","tag-developers","tag-microsoft-security-insights"],"yoast_head":"\n |