{"id":21247,"date":"2025-12-03T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-12-03T17:00:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"2026-02-19T17:21:49","modified_gmt":"2026-02-20T01:21:49","slug":"beyond-rc4-for-windows-authentication","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.microsoft.com\/en-us\/windows-server\/blog\/2025\/12\/03\/beyond-rc4-for-windows-authentication\/","title":{"rendered":"Beyond RC4 for Windows authentication"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
As organizations face an evolving threat landscape, strengthening Windows authentication is more critical than ever. The deprecation of RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) encryption in Kerberos is a shift toward modern, resilient security standards. RC4, once a staple for compatibility, is susceptible to attacks like Kerberoasting<\/a> that can be used to steal credentials and compromise networks. It is crucial to discontinue using RC4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By mid-2026, we will be updating the domain controller default assumed supported encryption types. The assumed supported encryption types is applied to service accounts that do not have an explicit configuration defined. Secure Windows authentication does not require RC4; AES-SHA1 can be used across all supported Windows versions since it was introduced in Windows Server 2008. If existing RC4 use is not addressed before the default change is applied, authentication relying on the legacy algorithm will no longer function. This blog post helps IT professionals transitioning to AES-SHA1 encryption by offering steps to detect and address remaining RC4 usage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For additional details on our Windows Update rollout strategy, check out this page on how to manage Kerberos KDC usage of RC4<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n