Using Channel Hopping to Increase 802.11 Resilience to Jamming Attacks
- Vishnu Navda ,
- Aniruddha Bohra ,
- Samrat Ganguly ,
- Dan Rubenstein
IEEE Infocom Minisymposium |
Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
802.11a, b, and g standards were designed for
deployment in cooperative environments, and hence do not
include mechanisms to protect from jamming attacks. In
this paper, we explore how to protect 802.11 networks from
jamming attacks by having the legitimate transmission hop
among channels to hide the transmission from the jammer.
Using a combination of mathematical analysis and prototype
experimentation in an 802.11a environment, we explore
how much throughput can be maintained in comparison
to the maintainable throughput in a cooperative, jam-free
environment. Our experimental and analytical results show
that in today’s conventional 802.11a networks, we can achieve
up to 60% of the original throughput. Our mathematical
analysis allows us to extrapolate the throughput that can be
maintained when the constraint on the number of orthogonal
channels used for both legitimate communication and for
jamming is relaxed.
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