The Optimal Admission Threshold in Observable Queues with State Dependent Pricing
- Christian Borgs ,
- Jennifer Chayes ,
- Sherwin Doroudi ,
- Mor Harchol-Balter ,
- Kuang Xu
Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences 28 |
We consider the social welfare model of Naor [20] and revenue-maximization model of Chen and Frank [7], where a single class of delay-sensitive customers seek service from a server with an observable queue, under state dependent pricing. It is known that in this setting both revenue and social welfare can be maximized by a threshold policy, whereby customers are barred from entry once the queue length reaches a certain threshold. However, no explicit expression for this threshold has been found. This paper presents the first derivation of the optimal threshold in closed form, and a surprisingly simple formula for the (maximum) revenue under this optimal threshold. Utilizing properties of the Lambert W function, we also provide explicit scaling results of the optimal threshold as the customer valuation grows. Finally, we present a generalization of our results, allowing for settings with multiple servers.